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Since the fall of the communist bloc fifteen years ago, the practice of 
democracy has spread infectiously from the old epicenters of Soviet power in Russia, 
Central Asia and Eastern Europe through the distant African, Asian, and American 
satellite states sponsored by the Cold War conflict.  Some genuine democratic 
transitions have taken place, while other shifts have been democratic more in form 
than substance.  But most of the countries of the world now at least go through the 
motions of holding elections and making verbal obeisance to concomitant respect for 
constitutional limits on government authority and incarnations of universal human 
rights.  Unless a nation has the economic, military, or political clout to shoulder its 
way into the world community on its own, at least some show (although arguably, no 
more than that) of respect for these values is perceived as necessary for successful 
participation in vital international institutions and processes.
In the wake of these developments, there has been an explosion of “national 
human rights institutions,” that is, independent government agencies whose purpose is 
to promote enforcement of human rights. Whereas there were only a few national 
human rights institutions before 1970, hundreds were established in the 
democratization wave of the 1990s.1
Like holding elections, drafting constitutions with pristinely separated powers 
and lengthy human rights guarantees, and ratifying international human rights 
instruments, creating national human rights institutions has provided a way for new 
democracies to signal a commitment to human rights and liberal values to the 
1 See International Council on Human Rights Policy, Performance and Legitimacy: National Human 
Rights Institutions 1 & 57-59 (March 2000), available at www.international-council.org (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2005) (hereafter ICHRP report); Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
Fact Sheet No. 19, National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (1993), 
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs19.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2005) (hereafter 
“UNHCR Fact Sheet”).  The United States has not established national human rights institutions as 
such on the federal level, preferring to channel such concerns exclusively through the courts apart from 
a few specialized bodies like the EEOC.  However, corollary institutions such as human rights 
commissions and ombudspersons are more common in the United States on the state and municipal 
level.
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international community.2 These institutions look much alike on paper, but their 
actual effect has varied enormously from state to state.  While some have languished 
in limbo, awaiting legislative implementation or the appointment of key officials, 
many are active, and some have become influential forces promoting human rights 
within their states.3
Minority groups4 should be a primary constituency for institutions whose 
mandate is to investigate claimed abuses and to protect vulnerable populations.  Many 
transitioning states are severely ethnically divided, with numerous minority groups, 
languages and religions, and with entrenched divisions between the groups.  These 
divisions and the conflicts they produce represent a fundamental challenge for the 
continuing existence of these states.  In these conflicts, human rights and minority 
2 Of course, this signaling purpose for acceding to international human rights standards is by no means 
unique to new democracies.  See David H. Moore, A Signaling Theory of Human Rights Compliance,
97 Northwestern Univ. L. Rev. 879 (2003).  But the development of new norms and institutions are 
steps that are inherent to the process of creating a new government, and are therefore characteristic of, 
although not exclusive to, new democracies’ efforts to signal compliance and thereby establish 
international credibility.    
3 See ICHRP report, supra note __, at111-17.
4
 I am using the term “minority group” here and throughout the article to refer to a non-majority 
community in a state made up of multiple communities, including ethnic, racial and religious groups.  
This term, like the others used to describe groups in this article, is both highly contestable and 
vigorously contested.  Nonetheless, I have chosen to use it because the term is in wide use in spite of its 
shortcomings and because much of what I will discuss in this article is a set of legal rights that are 
commonly referred to as “minority rights,” and so it is helpful to use a corresponding term to describe 
the groups to whom those rights might accrue.  Those attempting to define the term “minority” have 
managed to reach agree that a minority is a group of people within a state.  The sticking points have 
been (1) whether the test for minority status should be objective or subjective or both; (2) if objective, 
(a) whether the relevant criterion for minority status should be relative numbers or power or both, and 
(b) what other criteria are relevant for defining the scope of groups, e.g. ethnic, religious, or linguistic 
differences; and (3) if subjective, whether the relevant viewpoint should be that of other communities, 
that of the group in question, or both.  See, e.g., Francesco Capotorti, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-
commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Study on the Rights of 
Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities ¶ 568, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.78.XIV.1 (1979).  See also Explanatory Report, 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (entered into force 1998) (“It should 
also be pointed out that the framework Convention contains no definition of the notion of ‘national 
minority’…. based on the recognition that at this stage, it is impossible to arrive at a definition capable 
of mustering general support of all Council of Europe member States.”)
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rights values are one set of battlefields, and claimed abuses are the weapons of choice 
for all side s.5
Nonetheless, only a few of the newly established institutions in severely 
divided states report developing programs to effectively reach minority populations, 
and many shy away from involvement in their conflicts. Instead, the institutions that 
report establishing programs or offices to address minority concerns tend to be in 
better established democracies and less severely divided societies.  The programs that 
do exist in transitioning states tend to be limited, both in their aspirations and in their 
implementation.6
To some extent, these lapses can be described in pragmatic terms, as failures 
of resources, legal imagination, or political will. But on another level the question of 
the relationship between minority groups and rights – individual liberal rights and 
minority group rights – goes to the heart of a state’s vision of democracy.  Should
these transitioning states constitute themselves as liberal democracies, minimizing 
minority identities and emphasizing individual freedoms and a broader civic loyalty to 
the state?  Or would they do better to establish themselves as communitarian 
democracies, recognizing their multiple communities as the constituent elements of 
the states? In these struggles to define the structure of political power, both minority 
groups and the state put human rights values to use in service of their interests. 7
5
 Northern Ireland presents a classic example of a severely divided state where human rights claims are 
used by battling communities and the state.  See Dominic Bryan, Parading Protestants and Consenting 
Catholics in Northern Ireland, 5 Chi. J. Int’l L. 233 (2004). 
6
 As discussed below, many of the severely divided or transitioning states with minority-directed 
programs are current or aspiring members of the European Union, spurred to action by EU mandates.  
See discussion infra section C.2.
7
 Of course, whatever its structure, a democracy need not be either liberal or communitarian in its 
function.  Instead, elections may serve as a guise for establishing authoritarian control, for instituting a 
tyranny of the majority, or for minority rule through an effectively one-party system.  However, few 
governments will announce themselves as authoritarian.  A final possibility, then, is an illiberal, non-
communitarian state that will nonetheless conceptualize and market its rule to the population and the 
international community as the expression of either a confederation of multiple peoples, or of a single 
national identity, whether civic or ethnic in nature.  See generally FAREED ZAKARIA, ILLIBERAL 
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National human rights institutions offer a useful vantage point for considering 
these issues. While law professors and political scientists have the luxury of debating 
the nature of rights over coffee at Starbucks, and while courts rule on minority claims 
that have been reformulated into the proper legal jargon, national human rights 
institutions are the forum to which people come to demand their rights directly.  
These institutions must make day to day decisions on how best to navigate the 
conflicts and convergences of human rights and minority rights in the problems that 
come before them.  Their practical experiences and their own assessments of the 
principles that ought to guide them provide a prism for viewing the contested ideals of 
human and minority rights advocated by constitutional court doctrines and ivory 
tower elites.
This article is based on three lines of research:  a qualitative global study of 
the work of national human rights institutions with minority groups; a review of case 
studies of individual national human rights institutions and minority communities; and 
interviews and participation in public discussion with individual ombudspersons and 
commissioners.  To my knowledge, the qualitative study I have conducted is the first 
to look at the work of national human rights institutions with minority groups on a 
global basis.  My purpose in using this tripartite approach was, first, to offer new 
empirical data about the work of national human rights institutions with minority 
groups; and, second, to create synergies between the different types of information 
produced by each line of research while balancing their inherent strengths and 
weaknesses.  The appendix at the end of this article describes my research 
methodology, including the selection criteria and sources used for each of the three 
lines of research.
DEMOCRACIES (2002). 
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This article offers first, in part A, a discussion of the development of the 
system of minority rights and the democracy theory concerning those rights that 
provide the framework for the work of national human rights institutions on these 
issues.  In part B, I provide a brief introduction to national human rights institutions 
and then discuss the results of my research concerning their work with minority 
groups.  I identify patterns and trends in the development of minority-directed 
programs, and consider some of the crucial legal and political factors affecting such 
programs.
In part C, I consider the implications of my findings for the essential concepts 
of minority rights and democracy theory discussed in part A.  The problem cases that 
have always existed on the margins of democratic theory are far more central in 
severely divided and transitioning states and seem to be increasing, both in number 
and severity.  This theory of minority rights, developed in well- established liberal 
democratic states, ought not be exported directly to the context of new democracies.
 Finally, in part D, I discuss what role national human rights institutions might 
play in working with minority groups, focusing in particular on the complex concerns 
that arise in states where indigenous groups govern themselves under their own legal 
and political systems. While there are limits on the capacity of national human rights 
institutions, they could play a greater role than they do by serving as a forum for 
dialogue between minority groups and the state.
A. Minority Rights in Democracies
1. Group Conflict and International Rights
Most modern political states comprise multiple communities – ethnic, 
religious, linguistic, and cultural – that have conflicting interests, rights, and political 
preferences.   Each state must determine how to accommodate these communities’ 
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divergent interests within its political and legal structure.  While well-established 
states struggle with these issues, particularly in the context of the rapid social 
movements and changes produced by globalization, the problem is particularly acute 
for transitioning states whose basic political structures are in flux.  Because the make-
up and interrelationships of communities are various and fluid, transitioning states 
cannot expect to resolve this conundrum with a universal, readily transplantable 
solution.  
In this context, it must be noted that what Americans may consider obvious 
and natural solutions to minority group tensions in fact represent American 
exceptionalism based in the unrepresentative nature of American circumstances.  The 
United States’ indigenous communities8 represent a relatively small part of its 
population and do not now pose a fundamental threat to its security or national 
identity.   Since its inception, the United States has been accustomed to sweeping 
tides of immigration that have resulted in constantly shifting social group patterns, 
and in accordant shifts in inter-group dynamics and allegiances.  This is not to suggest 
that there is not substantial, significant group conflict in American society: of course, 
there is.  But the scope and intensity of that conflict, as well as the risks that it poses, 
are on a smaller scale than in other, severely divided states.  The United States has 
also developed a tradition of democratic process and judicial review that offers non-
violent mechanisms for producing social change, such as lobbying and lawsuits, that 
8
 As with the term “minority group,” see discussion supra note __, there is no single authoritative 
definition for the term “indigenous.”  The term originated as a self-designation to facilitate political 
activism in the United Nations and other international contexts.  See JOHN H. BODLEY, CULTURAL 
ANTHROPOLOGY: TRIBES, STATES, AND THE GLOBAL SYSTEM 361 (1994).  The International Labor 
Organization defines indigenous peoples as:  “peoples in independent countries who are regarded as 
indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a 
geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonization or the 
establishment of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all 
of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions.”  Convention (No. 169) Concerning 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries,(entered into force Sept. 5, 1991), art. 1 
(hereafter “ILO Convention No. 169”).  The convention also endorses self-identification as “a 
fundamental criterion” for indigenous or tribal status.  Id., art. 2.
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have been at least relatively open to minority groups. Accordingly, the American 
approach has been to guarantee a unique status for indigenous peoples and individual 
rights for other minority group members, while relying on representation through 
political parties and political process rather than group accommodations, rights or 
power-sharing to assure inter-group stability.  Whatever the pros and cons of these 
mechanisms in the American context, they are grounded in and shaped by that 
context.
In other states with different socio-political settings, the dynamics, the stakes, 
and the solutions are different.   Ethnic and religious conflict is a frequent catalyst of 
unrest, war, and state failure.  Separatist claims by communities that feel alienated 
from the state threaten the identity and territorial integrity of states from the Russian 
Federation to Indonesia to Iraq.  Some states are comprised almost entirely of 
indigenous groups with claims that predate the state, and there may be hundreds of 
such groups, each with their own interests, cultures, and languages, as in Nigeria and 
Nepal. Inter-group rivalries and allegiances may likewise extend back for generations 
before the establishment of the state.9
Minority groups may have little or no opportunity to use lawsuits enforcing 
individual rights to raise their concerns, either because individual rights are not 
directly enforceable in court (as they are not in many states), or because the concerns 
of minority groups are not encompassed by purely individual rights, as when they 
concern questions of autonomy or land.  By its nature, of course, the democratic 
process limits minority influence in policy-making by centering political power in 
majoritarian institutions.  This problem can be exacerbated in transitioning states that 
have mastered the form of democracy in the shape of elections, but have not yet 
9 See e.g., Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (1985); Rotimi N. Suberu, Federalism and 
Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria (2001). 
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developed the underpinnings of strong political parties or institutions of civil society 
that might integrate minority constituent interests into political platforms. In these 
contexts, states have adopted a range of political solutions, from explicit political 
power-sharing arrangements on the national level, to local guarantees of self-
government, to, on the other hand, deliberate repression of non-dominant minority 
groups and identities.10
At this point, it is worth pausing to consider: Why is this issue important to the 
state?  Why don’t states simply ignore the claims of non-dominant communities who 
do not succeed in asserting those claims through the existing political and legal 
structure?  Often, of course, states do ignore minority claims.  But, as often, they 
cannot.  If the state lacks the means to suppress, or at least to contain, separatist 
movements and minority calls for recognition and autonomy, it must somehow 
accommodate them, or risk destabilization.11 Often, it is the reality of violent conflict 
that moves a state to take account of minority concerns.12 And where such internal 
pressure does not exist, international pressure often plays a role.13 Finally, states with 
a true commitment to liberal democratic values will find themselves hard-pressed to 
deny entirely minority communities’ claims without abandoning fundamental precepts 
of justice and equality.14
Under these influences and imperatives, many states have pursued strategies 
of limited accommodation.  One such strategy has been the recognition of extensive 
10 See Rodolfo Stavenhagen, The Ethnic Question: Conflicts, Development and Human Rights 129-41 
(1990).
11 See e.g., Shaista Shameem, New Impulses in the Interaction of Law and Religion: The Fiji Human 
Rights Commission in Context, 2003 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 661, 662 (2003).
12 See Kieren McEvoy & John Morison, Beyond the Constitutional “Moment”: Law, Transition and 
Peacemaking in Northern Ireland, 26 Fordham Int’l L. J. 961, 993 n. 101 (2003); Honourable Hari N. 
Ramkarran, Seeking a Democratic Path: Constitutional Reform in Guyana, 32 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 
585, 597-98 (2003).
13
 See Paul R. Williams, Earned Sovereignty: The Road to Resolving the Conflict over Kosovo’s Final 
Status, 31 Denv. J. Int’l. L. & Policy 387 (2003).
14 See Mark D. Rosen, Liberalism and Illiberalism, 12 J. Contemporary Legal Issues 803, 830-31 
(2002).
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minority rights, both on an individual and group basis.15 To this end, a body of 
international and regional treaties has developed guaranteeing some rights to minority 
and indigenous groups, ranging from rights of self-determination, to rights to promote 
their own culture, religion, and language, to rights of equality and non-discrimination 
under the law.16 Especially in the last fifteen years, constitutions and national 
legislation have also implemented at least some minority and indigenous rights 
protections.17  However, many of the most robust and well elaborated statements of 
minority rights come in the form of unenforceable declarations and many are subject 
to numerous caveats acknowledging the ultimate sovereignty of the state.18
Furthermore, the legitimacy of minority rights as such is highly contested, and 
the nature of those rights (if their legitimacy is accepted in principle), hardly less so.   
There are three problematic aspects to defining minority rights: determining the 
content of those rights; determining to which groups those rights will accrue; and 
determining whether the rights are collective or individual in nature.19
The best-established minority rights are those that are an integral part of the 
human rights canon.  The prohibitions on genocide and discrimination, and the rights
to practice one’s religion, use one’s language, and enjoy one’s culture without 
15
 Protecting minority rights rather than universal rights is not a new phenomenon, but rather, 
represents a resurgence of an earlier practice. As concern over minority groups’ vulnerability rose in 
Europe in the early part of the twentieth century, states agreed to bilateral and then multilateral treaties 
protecting particular minority groups.  These earlier treaties were then superceded by the individual 
human rights approach after World War II.  See Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship 2 (1985) 
(hereafter “Multicultural Citizenship”). 
16 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1, 26 & 27 (entered into force 
Mar. 23, 1976) (hereafter “ICCPR”); Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 
(entered into force 1 February 1998) (hereafter “National Minorities Framework Convention”); 
Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, art. 3, (entered into 
force Sept. 5, 1991) (hereafter “ILO Convention No. 169”).
17 See, e.g., ETH. CONST., art. 39.
18 See, e.g., Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Adopted by the 
U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities by its resolution 
1994/45, August 26, 1994. U.N. Dec./CN.4/1995/2, E/CN./Sub.2/1994/56, at 105 (1994); Proposed 
American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Approved by the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights on February 26, 1997, at its 1333rd session, 95th regular session. 
19 See Miriam J. Aukerman, Definitions and Justifications: Indigenous and Minority Group Protections 
in a Central/East European Context, 22.4 HUMAN RTS. Q. 1011, 1030-32 (2000).
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interference from the state are well established in positive law and are accepted by 
most states, at least in principle.20  While they tend to operate for the benefit of 
minority groups, only the cultural rights are defined by reference to minority status.
Although these rights, particularly the cultural rights, are generally exercised in a 
group, they are understood to be enforceable in court by individuals rather than by the 
group as a whole.21
In contrast, while the right to self-determination has been asserted repeatedly 
in international instruments such as the UN charter, there is not consensus on the 
scope of this right nor on which groups are entitled to exercise it.  Because it is a right 
that is understood to be collective rather than individual, it is often treated as non-
justiciable.22   And although a set of other, commonly asserted minority rights has 
emerged – rights of participation as well as autonomy, rights to measures designed to 
achieve substantive as well as procedural equality, rights to self-definition as well as 
self-determination –  there is not broad international consensus on these additional 
rights either.
Some of the most difficult minority-related issues for national human rights 
institutions lurk here, at the cusp of newly developing minority rights.  The most 
notable recent developments in recent minority rights standards have been 
implemented through new, regionally accepted treaties focused specifically on 
minority rights, such as the International Labor Organization’s Convention No. 169 
on indigenous peoples (ratified primarily by American states) and the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (ratified solely by European 
20
 See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (entered into force Jan. 
12, 1951) (hereafter “Genocide Convention”); ICCPR, supra note __, art. 1, 26, & 27.
21
 Protection against discrimination extends to all individuals, while protection against genocide is held 
by all members of national, ethnic, religious, or racial groups, regardless of minority status.  See
ICCPR, supra note __, art. 26-27; Genocide Convention, supra note __, art. 2.
22 See, e.g., R.L. v. Canada, Communication No. 358/1989: Canada 28/11/90. CCPR/C/43/D/358/1989 
(UN Human Rights Committee decision).
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states).23  These treaties list extensive and detailed rights accruing to the protected 
groups, far beyond the general principles of prior human rights treaties. For example, 
ILO Convention No. 169 not only protects indigenous groups’ rights to use their 
traditional lands, but also requires states to take account of their spiritual connection 
to the land, traditional ownership and methods of transmitting land, and their 
traditional use and natural resources.  Not only must states permit indigenous 
communities to maintain their own internal legal systems, they must also respect their 
methods of punishment and take account of their culture when punishing them in state 
courts.24  Likewise, the Framework Convention not only guarantees national 
minorities’ use of their own language privately, but also on public signs, with the 
authorities in minority areas, and upon arrest.25
But it is not merely in their specificity and extent that these claimed but 
contested minority rights differ from older, better accepted ones. While minority 
community members’ rights to non-discrimination and equality under the law are 
readily exercised and enforced as individual rights, some of the interests promoted by 
these new treaties are by their nature exercised either by the community as a whole, or 
at least by community members in concert with one another. In particular, the specific 
rights to use of land and to legal systems protected by the ILO convention are less 
consonant with political and civil liberties, which are held and enforced individually, 
23
 ILO Convention No. 169 requires states to implement “special measures” to protect indigenous 
peoples and their cultures in areas as law, development, land use, and education, but it has been ratified 
by a limited number of countries, most heavily in Central and South America.  These rights apply only 
to indigenous peoples as defined by the treaty. See ILO Convention No. 169, supra note __, art. 1 & 5; 
International Labor Organization website, ratifications, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-
lex/ratifce.pl?C169 (last viewed Feb. 25, 2005).. See also Framework Convention, supra note __; 
Explanatory Report, Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, par. 13; 
European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (Council of Europe) (entered into force Mar. 1, 
1998). The Framework Convention has been ratified by virtually all European states, but it has no 
equivalent outside of Europe and has not been ratified by any non-European states.  See Council of 
Europe website, Treaty office, Framework convention ratification page, http://conventions.coe.int (last 
visited February 27, 2004)
24 See ILO No. 169, supra note __.  
25 See Framework Convention, supra note __.
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and more consonant with economic and social rights, which are held collectively and 
therefore often regarded as non-justiciable. It is notable, therefore, that even as it 
ensures rights such as language that could be characterized as group or collective 
rights,  the Framework Convention on National Minorities carefully couches these 
rights as accruing to individual community members, rather than to the communities 
themselves.26  In so doing, it makes its mandates more amenable to enforcement in 
courts; however, it simultaneously limits the scope and character of the rights that can 
be claimed.  Some minority groups have complained that their interests are 
fundamentally diminished for being reduced from collective claims to individual 
ones, and from claims for community governance to claims for particularized 
protections for narrow interests.27 Minority claims that are either collective or socio-
economic in nature, or both, have presented challenges for national human rights 
institutions.
The other sense in which these new rights are defined differently than the old 
is in the relationship that these treaties anticipate the state will develop with its 
minority groups.  Ordinarily, states are expected to respect minority groups by not 
interfering with them (e.g., by granting autonomy, ignoring private cultural practices, 
and so on) or by actively protecting them from outside threats.28  These new treaties 
require the state also to consult with indigenous and national minority groups, to 
interact with them, and to grant them the right to participate authoritatively in the 
state, rather than solely giving them a defined sphere of autonomy.  Thus, ILO
Convention No. 169 does not merely require the state not to interfere with indigenous 
groups’ traditional land through development, nor merely to protect indigenous 
26 See id.
27 See C.C. Tenant and M.E. Turpel, A Case Study of Indigenous Peoples: Genocide, Ethnocide and 
Self-Determination, 59 Nordic J. Int’l L 287, 291 (1990).
28 See, e.g. ICCPR, supra note __, art. 27.
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groups from unwanted development by private parties, but also to consult with 
indigenous groups about the state’s development plans that would affect them and 
about the groups’ own independently determined development goals, and to ensure 
that they are able to participate in decision-making. 29 Similarly, although less 
extensively, the Framework Convention requires states to “create the conditions 
necessary for the effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities in 
social, economic and cultural life and in public affairs, in particular those affecting 
them.”30
This is a far more sophisticated vision of the relationship between indigenous 
groups and the state, and one that is in some ways far more demanding than a mere 
cession of limited autonomy.  In particular, and as will be discussed at length later, 
these complex demands are also reflected in the claims received by national human 
rights institutions, and they require the state to develop fora for effective dialogue 
between the minority group and the state.
Finally, where a framework of minority rights has succeeded in taking root, 
the recharacterization of minority interests as legal rights has proven a powerful
rhetorical and legal tool for minority groups.  The resurgence of minority rights
principles in recent years has permitted groups to move certain battles from the 
political arena (where they frequently lost) to the legal arena (where their record may 
improve), and to use this threatened change of venue as an additional bargaining chip 
in the political realm as well. It has also provided minority groups with a legally 
cognizable shield against human rights based attacks by the state.  Instead of claiming 
their internal practices represent an extra-legal, cultural exception to legal human 
rights standards, they can now reify their cultural claim as a legal one, the human 
29 See ILO Treaty No. 169, supra note __, art. 6-7.
30 See Framework Convention, supra note __, art. 15.
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right to practice and preserve their culture.31 The trade-off is, as discussed above, that 
to make these claims legally cognizable in the current legal structures, they must be 
limited and narrowed.  But in at least some cases, this trade-off may be worthwhile.  
For human rights claims cut both ways:  while I have thus far discussed only 
the ways in which minority groups use rights to pursue their agendas with the state, 
states also use human rights claims to contain and control minority groups.  
Communities may be perceived as challenging the liberal values promoted by human 
rights law, and state recognition of “cultural exceptions” to human rights guarantees 
or of some level of autonomy or self-government outside the scope of human rights 
guarantees may be regarded as “shield[ing] illiberal and undemocratic enclaves.”32 A 
minority community’s failure to adhere to human rights principles may serve as a 
point of criticism by the state, justifying interference with community norms or 
institutions.33 Alternatively, community members may themselves turn to the state to 
enforce their rights.  
Human rights guarantees thus present an acute catalyst of conflict between 
minority communities and the state, as well as a mechanism for channeling conflicts 
between minority groups and the state.  Accordingly, the patterns of those conflicts in 
new democracies depends to some extent on the system of minority group protections 
the transitioning state adopts.
2. Democracy Theory
31
 Concerning conflicts between human rights claims and culture, see Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims 
and Saviors: The Metaphors of Human Rights, 42 Harv. Int’l L. J. 201 (2001); Leti Volpp, Feminism 
versus Multiculturalism, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1181, 1187 (2001); L. Amede Obiora, “Supri, supri, 
supri, Oyibo?”  An Interrogation of Gender Mainstreaming Deficits, 29:2 Signs: Journal of Women in 
Culture and Society 649, 654 (2003). 
32
 James Tully, Strange Multiplicity 191 (1995) (criticizing this perception).
33See, e.g.,  Elizabeth Heger Boyle, Female Genital Cutting (2002).
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Democracy theorists who focus on questions of minority rights offer a range 
of views about the proper place and scope of those rights.34  For purposes of this 
discussion, there are three focal points on this spectrum that represent important 
touchstones for newly emerging democracies: traditional liberalism, liberal pluralism, 
and communitarianism.35
On the one hand, liberal thinkers such as Chandran Kukathas and Jürgen 
Habermas argue that the core of legitimate democracy is individual, liberal rights.  
Traditional liberals contend that these rights adequately protect minority cultures, and 
that minority group claims that cannot be characterized as classic liberal, individual 
rights inevitably conflict with and diminish those individual rights in practice.36  The 
United States has by and large adopted this approach, providing minorities with the 
full gamut of individual political and civil liberties including the right to be free from 
discrimination, and providing particular minority protections only through narrowly 
34
 The writing on the place of minority group rights in the democratic state is only one branch, albeit a 
fairly discrete one, of the vast literature on minority and majority groups in the modern state.  See, e.g., 
Arendt Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (1977); Ernst Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (1983); 
Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (1985); Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: 
Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (1991); Stephen Tierney, Constitutional Law and 
National Pluralism (2004). 
35
 Surrounding these three focal points are numerous subtle distinctions and debates that I cannot 
explore here, in the interest of focusing on those aspects that are most crucial to my study.  Several 
concerns that I do not discuss are the relative “thickness” or “thinness” of national and minority 
identities, the significance of other political values to this debate, and the contested definitions of 
virtually every crucial term. See, e.g., Multiculturalism (ed. Amy Guttman 1994) (essays including 
Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, Jürgen Habermas, Struggles for Recognition in the 
Democratic Constitutional State,  and K. Anthony Appiah, Identity, Authenticity, Survival: 
Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction).
36
 See Jürgen Habermas, Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State, in 
MULTICULTURALISM, supra note __, at 113 (“A correctly understood theory of rights requires a politics 
of recognition that protects the integrity of the individual in the life contexts in which his or her identity 
is formed.  This does not require an alternative model that would correct the individualistic design of 
the system of rights through other normative perspectives.  All that is required is the consistent 
actualization of the system of rights.”).  Chandran Kukathas makes the more modest claim that while 
liberalism may not optimally protect minority interests, it nonetheless provides the best possibility for 
conflicting groups and individuals to co-exist by not promoting any individual or group notion of the 
good but merely “upholding the framework of law within which individuals and groups can function 
peacefully.”  See Chandran Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago 249 (2003) (hereafter “Liberal 
Archipelago”).  
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crafted exceptions granting autonomy for Native Americans and permitting racial 
distinctions to facilitate certain affirmative action programs.
In contrast, “liberal pluralists” such as Will Kymlicka and Charles Taylor 
argue that traditional theorists err by conceiving of the liberal state as culturally 
neutral, when it in fact possesses and enforces certain culturally specific 
characteristics (such as its choice of official language) on a multicultural polity. 37
Because individuals value their cultures and can exercise freedom of choice 
meaningfully only in the context of those cultures, individual autonomy requires that 
minority cultures be preserved  Accordingly, providing some additional, systematic 
protections for minority groups with other cultural characteristics will not necessarily 
conflict with, and will in fact often promote, core liberal values of justice and 
individual autonomy.38
The difficult questions for liberal pluralists are identifying which groups 
should be entitled to protections, what sorts of claims should be recognized, and what 
sort of protections are appropriate.  Liberal pluralists such as Kymlicka have 
developed a typology of groups (e.g., immigrants, national minorities, and indigenous 
groups) and of the corresponding claims they might make (non-discrimination, 
respect for language, territorial autonomy) and the justifications for those claims 
(distinctiveness, consent, authenticity, and so on).  On the margins, of course, these 
are line-drawing questions, but liberal pluralists approach these questions in the first 
instance by weighing the justifications in liberal philosophy for each group’s core 
37
 The terms to be used in describing the plural communities within a state are many and contested.  I 
am using the term “multicultural” here as the broadest of those terms, to encompass, many kinds of 
difference within a state.  However, liberal writers more frequently deploy narrower terms such as 
“multinational,” “polynational,” “polyethnic,” and so on, to distinguish amongst communities as to the 
basis and legitimacy of their claims for protection, and to describe the subset of groups for which they 
would endorse such protections.  “Multiculturalism,” therefore, describes the total set of communities 
within the state, and not the subset(s) of groups for which one or another liberal thinker would endorse 
protections.  See Multicultural Citizenship, supra note __, at 10.  
38 See id. at 75-84; Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in Multiculturalism, supra note __.  
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claims.  The hard cases are those groups, claims, or protections that threaten to 
impinge on liberal values or that place liberal values in conflict with each other.39
From either the traditional or the new perspective, however, liberals agree that 
a fundamental risk in recognizing minority group claims for cultural protections or 
self-government is that these communities will form illiberal enclaves that will 
threaten the state’s essential character as a liberal democracy.40  For liberals, then, the 
limits of the state’s toleration of a minority community’s peculiar qualities and 
practices is set by the group’s illiberal tendencies.41  South Africa has adopted a 
version of the liberal pluralist approach.  Its constitution protects minority languages, 
cultures and religions and recognizes the authority of tribal governments, but its 
constitutional court has consistently held that the constitution’s individual liberties 
trump these minority group protections, so that for example traditional inheritance 
rules cannot be applied to disfavor women.42
Communitarians such as James Tully argue that liberal values should be only 
one of many sets of values in a robust constitutional democracy.43    Beginning with 
39 See Multicultural Citizenship, supra note __, at 75-84.
40 See Multicultural Citizenship, supra note __, at 75.  A second, inter-related risk is to the unity of the 
state.  If the liberal democratic state is held together by a common faith in liberal democratic values, 
then the illiberal values of some communities undermines state unity.  See Liberal Archipelago, supra 
note __, at 98.  
41
 This is, of course, not the end of the argument.  For a discussion of the details of this ongoing debate 
between traditional liberals (Liberalism I) and new liberals (Liberalism II), see Tierney, supra note __, 
at 51-68.  Kymlicka, Taylor and the rest disagree sharply not only on line-drawing, but also on vital 
questions of the basis for discerning the character of particular claims, whether some group and claims 
can call upon foundational principles of the liberal state to reconcile their claims with liberal ideals and 
compel their recognition, and whether it might in some instances be appropriate for liberal democratic 
states to recognize certain minority group claims in spite of the concomitant risk or reality of 
illiberality, but without reaching consensus on these issues.  See Multicultural Citizenship 94-101; 
Chandran Kukathas, Cultural Toleration, in Ethnicity and Group Rights 72-78 (comparing but not 
endorsing the views of John Rawls, Will Kymlicka and Deborah Fitzmaurice).
42 See S. AF. CONST.; Shibi case, 2004 CCT 49/03, (S. Af. Const. Ct. 2004).
43
 While Kymlicka and Taylor are at times identified as communitarians by traditional liberals, they 
straddle the gap between the traditional liberal and communitarian positions. The line I draw between 
liberal pluralists and communitarians is whether the theorist uses core liberal values as the ultimate test: 
liberal pluralists insist that minority communities must cede at least to certain core liberal values; 
communitarians do not.  See Taylor, supra note __, at 60 (“Even pluralist models of liberalism “do call 
for the invariant defense of certain rights, of course.  There would be no question of cultural 
differences determining the application of habeas corpus, for example.” (emphasis in original)).  
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the two premises endorsed by liberal pluralists (that liberal constitutional states 
endorse a particular set of cultural values and that individuals perceive the value of 
their choices and exercise their autonomy within the cultural values established by 
their communities), Tully and other communitarians argue that constitutional 
democracy should not center on individual rights or on participation in a 
constitutional order that is preconceived as privileging a certain set of liberal rights.  
Rather, for a constitutional order to be legitimate, all the communities44 within the 
state must be true constituents of the state, in the sense that their preferences as to 
how the state should be constituted and organized must be incorporated into the state 
order.45  Inevitably, this will produce a non-uniform order, as communities will have 
different preferences.46  Sanctifying liberal rights over other rights and interests 
preferred by minority communities thus undermines the legitimacy of the democracy 
for those communities.47  For Tully and other communitarians, therefore, not liberal 
values but authenticity is the touchstone, and not tolerance, but incorporation (at least, 
to the extent desired by the community) is the goal. 
However, since most individuals are members of multiple communities, and 
since each of those communities is likely to have at least slightly different 
preferences,48 the difficulty for communitarians, as for liberals, is determining which 
communities to privilege.  Because community values will inevitably and frequently 
come into conflict, particularly when extruded from the community and incorporated 
44
 For a discussion of the competing definitions of community for purposes of communitarian theory, 
including geographical and kin communities, perceptions of the common good, and shared interests, 
see Liberal Archipelago, supra note __, at 168-78. 
45
 “[C]ulture is an irreducible and constitutive aspect of politics.  … if the cultural ways of the citizens 
were recognized and taken into account in reaching an agreement on a form of constitutional 
association, the constitutional order, and the world of everyday politics it constitutes, would be just 
with respect to this dimension of politics.  Since the diverse cultural ways of the citizens are excluded 
or assimilated, it is, to that extent, unjust.”  TULLY, supra note __, at 5-6.
46 See id. at 55-56.  
47 See id. at 86-89.
48 See Liberal Archipelago, supra note __,  at 177.
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into the state as a whole, the hard cases, for communitarians, are those that require 
either/or, irreconcilable choices between community preferences that “conflict 
violently in practice.”49 In so doing, communitarians use criteria such as authenticity 
and continuity of community traditions, criteria that overlap with liberal pluralist 
concerns, especially in so far as they tend to favor the groups also favored by the 
liberal pluralist typology, namely indigenous groups followed by other national 
minorities.50  Ethiopia has adopted a version of the communitarian approach: 
recognized ethnic groups have the constitutional right to cultural protections, self-
government and even secession, and the question of whether liberal rights also 
protected by the constitution must be enforced within self-governing communities has 
not yet been decided.51
As these theories are exported to transitioning states in the form of 
international pressure to ratify human rights and minority rights treaties and to include 
protections in their constitutions, most new democracies have adopted one or another 
of these basic approaches, at least formally.   Both the state and its minority groups 
have begun exploring the opportunities these legal structures present for framing and 
pursuing their interests. In this conflicted context, national human rights institutions 
are positioned, if they wish, to play an active role.
B. National Human Rights Institutions and Minority Groups
1. What Are National Human Rights Institutions?
National human rights institutions are the latest tool to be touted by 
international bodies and funded by international donors for effective enforcement of 
human rights on the national level.  As such, they represent another aspect of the 
ongoing effort to export human rights norms to transitioning states.  At least on the 
49
 TULLY, supra note _, at 6.
50 See id. at 138.
51 See ETH. CONST., art. 39.
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formal level, this effort has been successful: more states have established national 
human rights institutions in the last twenty years than in all the time before. Virtually 
every national human rights institution in Africa and Latin America has been 
established since 1985.52
In essence, national human rights institutions are independent government 
agencies directed at human rights concerns.  They are intended to complement the 
work of other government institutions such as courts, and of private institutions such 
as non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”), in investigating and redressing human 
rights abuses.  They are designed to be highly accessible to the public by maintaining 
an open door policy for accepting complaints.  They are also meant to be influential 
with the government, but not according to the benchmark that human rights advocates 
typically call upon, enforcement.   Rather than enforcing human rights by ordering 
reforms as a court would do, national human rights institutions promote change by 
means of persuasion, and have no direct coercive powers.53
Most national human rights institutions are organized as one of two major 
types, human rights commissions or ombudspersons.  There are also numerous 
hybrids and variations on these central types, of which perhaps the most widespread is 
the office of the defensores del pueblo, a Central and South American variation on the 
ombudsperson.54  The functions of national human rights institutions, however named 
and organized, typically include investigating possible human rights abuses either sua 
52 See Lorena González Volio, The Ombudsman Institution: The Latin American Experience 5 (noting 
that the only ombudsman established in Latin America before 1990 was Guatemala’s in 1985, and that 
“the process of creating and incorporating the institution of the Ombudsman… arises in the nineties, 
when the so called ‘transition to democracy’ period began”); Mary Ellen Tsekos, Human Rights 
Institutions in Africa, 9 Hum. Rts. Br. 21, 21 (2002).
53 See Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 19, National 
Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (1993), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs19.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2005) ( hereafter “UNHCR Fact 
Sheet”).
54 See ICHRP report, supra note__, at 4; Building Democratic Institutions, supra note __.
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sponte or in response to complaints; issuing non-binding recommendations; 
organizing education, training and publicity programs; and reporting to national 
legislatures and international bodies.55
 The United Nations, the international community at large, and the academic 
literature on the subject of national human rights institutions have all tended to focus 
on national human rights commissions and to brush aside ombudspersons as 
subsidiary bodies that serve many of the same functions.56  This has had two 
unfortunate results: first, a failure to notice the work being done by ombudspersons, 
especially on minority rights, that has important ramifications for the field (discussed 
in the next part); and also, a tendency to conflate the two bodies that overlooks 
substantial differences between them despite their overlapping roles.  For although 
they share a common purpose and certain general attributes such as flexible, informal 
procedures, ombudspersons and human rights commissions have different histories 
and core functions.  In particular, while human rights commissions often work on 
individual cases, they also investigate and make recommendations concerning
systemic human rights violations on an institutional or national level.57  In contrast, 
the ombudsperson’s core function is not to analyze and comment on broad issues in 
55 See Building Democratic Institutions, supra note __.
56 See Marnie Lloydd & Alexander H.E. Morawa, Ombudspersons and Minority Rights, at 2-3, 
available at European Centre or Minority Issues website, www.ecmi.de (last viewed Jan. 25, 2005).
57
 Human rights commissions usually have jurisdiction over both government and private conduct. 
Linda Reif notes that human rights commissions may be better suited to address human rights 
complaints in states that have both institutions, because they can handle complaints “which arise in 
both the private and public spheres, typically enjoy a stronger arsenal of powers, are often directed to 
provide educational and promotional activities and employ human rights norms as an imperative aspect 
of their mandate.”  Linda C. Reif, The Promotion of International Human Rights Law by the Office of 
the Ombudsman, in The International Ombudsman Anthology, 272 (ed. Linda C. Reif 1999) (hereafter 
“Promotion”).  They are also more likely than ombudspersons to be empowered to advise the 
legislature on pending legislation or on ratification of or compliance with international human rights 
treaties.  See Brice Dickson, The Contribution of Human Rights Commissions to the Protection of 
Human Rights, The Harry Street Lecture, University of Manchester (21 November 2002).  Some states 
have established an individual commissioner who operates more like an ombudsperson than like a 
human rights commission, in spite of the title. See Mjemmas G.J. Kimweri, The Effectiveness of an 
Executive Ombudsman, in The International Ombudsman Anthology, supra, at 382-85 (Tanzanian 
Permanent Commission of Enquiry).
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the abstract, but to resolve individual complaints. However, an ombudsperson may 
recognize systemic problems and recommend solutions that range from personal 
responses to individual petitioners to structural changes across government 
institutions.  Its influence, like that of the human rights commission, therefore extends 
beyond the limits of the immediate case to the government and nation as a whole.58
In spite of the shared name, these human rights commissions are different 
from the “truth commissions” and “human rights commissions” that transitioning 
governments sometimes establish to address the transitional justice problem of abuses 
by past regimes, such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa.  
Transitional justice-oriented truth and human rights commissions are temporary and 
typically have jurisdiction only over the prior government, not the present one.  In 
contrast, national human rights institutions are permanent and have jurisdiction over 
the present government.  As such, they serve different purposes:  transitional justice 
commissions aim to account for the atrocities of the past and promote reconciliation 
in the present, while national human rights institutions are meant to call the current 
government to account in the present and promote better policies for the future.59
The authority of national human rights institutions to remedy human rights 
violations usually extends only to investigation and recommendation and not to 
binding judgment or to direct enforcement of their recommendations. The primary 
58 The office of the ombudsman originated under the Swedish monarchy in the eighteenth century to 
investigate government maladministration and was gradually adopted by other states for this purpose. 
Accordingly, ombudspersons usually have jurisdiction only over government, not private, actions. As 
concern with human rights has grown, some ombudsperson’s offices have taken on investigation of 
government human rights violations under the umbrella of their general authority to investigate 
government misconduct.  Recently, states have begun to establish ombudspersons with the specific 
mandate of human rights enforcement.   See Lloyd & Morawa, supra note __; Promotion, supra note 
__, at 273-74 & 288-91.
59
 National human rights commissions are also different from the similarly named United Nations 
Human Rights Commission, which is an international body addressing human rights concerns 
worldwide, and from both international and national non-governmental organizations that may also 
have similar names.  Because so many different kinds of institutions are referred to as “human rights 
commissions,” one can determine whether an organization is a national human rights institution only 
by looking at its mandate and organization, and not merely at its name.
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tools used by these institutions to promote change are therefore direct mediation 
between the parties to resolve individual complaints, and publicity, reporting, and 
public shaming to promote changes in public policy. Some institutions do, however, 
have standing to bring disciplinary actions, lawsuits, or other proceedings against 
government officials and entities to remedy violations of the law, as does the 
Namibian Ombudsman.60
On first consideration, these limits on judgment and enforcement seem to 
represent a disturbing trade-off between institutional effectiveness and states’ 
willingness to establish human rights institutions in the first place.61  However, the 
trade-off is not so stark as it may seem.  National human rights institutions operate in 
the context of other institutions that do have enforcement powers, such as the courts, 
and they are intended to supplement, not to replace, those institutions.62
Such critiques also fail to recognize the inherent limits on the effectiveness of 
enforceable legal mechanisms:  they are expensive, inaccessible and slow, and 
therefore often go unused.  For everyday claims, the national human rights institution 
offers a swift means for an individual to get behind the walls of bureaucracy and have 
his complaint considered by the otherwise inaccessible officials who have the 
authority to remedy his concern.  Similarly, in controversial, high profile cases, 
60 See Udo Kempf and Marco Mille, The Role and Function of the Ombudsman: Personalised 
Parliamentary Control in Forty-Eight Different States, in THE INTERNATIONAL OMBUDSMAN 
ANTHOLOGY, supra note __, at 195, 217 (Appendix 3).  This is particularly important in countries that 
limit standing to raise constitutional challenges to certain government officials.  As Lloyd and Morawa 
note, this role is particularly vital in “countries in transition,” where many old laws and institutional 
practices may conflict with the new constitution and where there may be a lack of institutional 
traditions and practices to rectify the matter.  See Lloyd & Morawa, supra note __ at 10.
61
 This bears on the question often raised in human rights circles concerning the enforceability of 
human rights norms: whether unenforceable or unenforced norms are valuable even in the breach, or 
whether they are at times implemented even if unenforceable, and if so, why and how.  See, e.g., Oona 
Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Work?, 111 Yale L.J. 1935 (2002).  My argument is one 
commonly although not universally endorsed by ombudspersons:  that the lack of enforcement 
mechanisms makes these institutions complementary to and at times even more effective than courts 
and other binding means of enforcing human rights. 
62
 Also, obstruction of the ombudsperson or failure to follow her formal recommendation is a 
punishable offense in some states, even if the ombudsperson lacks enforcement power of her own See
Lorena González Volio, The Ombudsman Institution: The Latin American Experience 24.
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national human rights institutions have been at times arguably more effective 
precisely because their investigations do not present as direct and immediate a threat 
to governments as they would if their conclusions were enforceable.63 National human 
rights institutions have in fact investigated controversial, high profile allegations of 
severe government abuse, and their conclusions and recommendations have revealed 
and challenged otherwise untouched and seemingly untouchable government policies 
and practices.  It is then up to other forces in society to pick up the gauntlet thrown 
down by the national human rights institution, and to provide the pressure necessary 
to back the institution’s call for change.64  Thus, the appropriate comparison in many 
ordinary cases is not between the enforcement mechanisms available through a court 
and the lack of mechanisms available to the human rights institution, but between 
having human rights claims evaluated through some process, even if only advisory, or 
not having them addressed at all.  
2. Minority-Directed Programs
Although national human rights institutions are well situated to play a 
complementary role to other state and non-governmental agencies by reach ing out to 
vulnerable and underrepresented minority communities and by intervening in human 
rights based conflicts between minority groups and the state, they tend to be used in 
much more conservative and limited ways. I will begin by giving an overview of the 
minority-directed programs that do exist, and then turn to the legal and political 
reasons that national human rights institutions’ involvement in minority  issues tends 
to be limited.  After considering and accounting for these limits, the experiences of 
institutions that have struggled with minority concerns expose issues that go to the 
63
 But see Vijayashri Sripati, India’s National Human Rights Commission: A Shackled Commission?, 
18 BOSTON UNIV. INT’L L.J. 1, 30-31 (2000).
64 See ICHRP Report, supra note __, at 26 & 63 (Malaysia & Togo).
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heart of the relationship between minority groups, human rights claims, and 
democracy.  I will turn to those in part C.
In spite of the socio-political context of acute minority relations issues in 
transitioning states and a developing framework of minority rights as a legal context 
for human rights work, most national human rights institutions do not work on 
minority group issues as such.  Indeed, my survey of the public reports, websites, and 
promotional materials of hundreds of institutions around the world found that only a 
few describe working on minority issues or with minority groups as being a priority in 
their work.65  Corroborating the results of this general survey were my discussions 
with individual ombudspersons at a conference of the International Ombudsman 
Institute in 2004, which confirmed that only a limited number of those offices either 
had pursued work with minority groups or regarded it as a future priority to do so.66
There are several identifiable trends amongst those institutions that do 
describe themselves as working with minority groups.  First, there are striking 
regional differences.  In Asia and Africa, where many states have an extreme diversity 
of ethnic groups and sharp divisions, there are very few reports of minority -directed 
programs of any kind.67 Some Asian institutions have been noted for occasional high 
profile inquiries into riots or violent police abuse (or for their failure to inquire into 
such matters), and there has been far more focus on involvement in religious conflicts 
than ethnic ones.68  In Africa, those programs that do exist come in two varieties: 
efforts to overcome problems of language and geography in highly linguistically 
65
  There may of course be a gap between publicly reported activities and actual activities, but if so, 
then at a minimum these institutions do not view it as being to their advantage to advertise their work 
with minority groups.
66
 Proceedings of International Ombudsman Institute Quebec Conference (Sep. 7-9, 2004) (notes on 
file with author) (hereafter “IOI notes”).
67
 Two unusual exceptions are South Africa’s Commission for the Rights of Cultural, Religious and 
Linguistic Communities, see http://www.crlcommission.org.za/index.html and India’s National 
Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, see http://ncscst.nic.in/home.htm.
68 See, e.g., Shameem, supra note __, at 662.
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divided and rural states, and efforts to discourage traditional practices that run afoul of 
human rights norms.  However, reporting by these institutions is itself inconsistent.69
In Mexico and Central and South America, a few more states reported at least 
some specialized programs and offices.70  Without exception, these are devoted to 
indigenous groups: none report programs relating to other minority groups.  However, 
upon investigation, only a few of these programs could be confirmed to be active.71 In 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand there are offices, commissioners and programs 
devoted to indigenous groups, often on the provincial level, and these report 
substantially more activity than their Central and South American counterparts. 72
National and regional human rights institutions in these states have also taken on high 
profile discrimination cases, and human rights commissions in Canada may be either 
exclusively or primarily devoted to anti-discrimination efforts.73 In local and 
municipal institutions in the United States, with few exceptions, any programs 
directed at minority groups are focused solely upon anti-discrimination initiatives.  
The exceptions, as in the other American states and Australia and New Zealand, are 
for indigenous groups.74
69 The lack of empirical data about human rights practices in Africa has been noted by other scholars.  
See Bonny Ibhawoh, Between Culture and Constitution: Evaluating the Cultural Legitimacy of Human 
Rights in the African State, 22 Human Rts. Q. 838, 840 (2000). I found African institutions less likely 
to make information available over the internet, less likely to report regularly to regional and 
international institutions, and less likely to be the subject of scholarly reports, than European, 
American, and Australian institutions.
70
 Yes:  Guatemala, Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela Ecuador, Mexico No: Belize, Costa Rica, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Guyana, Parguay, Uruguay
71
 Confirmed: Guatemala, Peru Venezuela, Mexico Not confirmed: El Salvador, Bolivia, Colombia, 
Ecuador
72
 A prominent example is the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner in 
Australia.  In these states, minority-directed work is frequently carried out on the regional or local 
level. See, e.g., Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission website, 
www.humanrights.gov.au/socialjustice/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2005).
73 See David M. Tanovich, Racial Profiling and Police Practice in Canada: E-racing Racial Profiling, 
41 Alberta L. Rev. 905, 908 (2004); Carlos Scott Lopez, Australian Immigration Policy at the 
Centenary: The Quest for Control, 18 Geo. Immig. L. J. 1 (2003). 
74 See Reuel E. Schiller, The Emporium Capwell Case: Race, Labor Law, and the Crisis of Post-War 
Liberalism, 25 Berkeley J. Emp. & Labor L. 129 (2004). One exception is the Ombudsperson for 
American Indian Families in Minnesota, who works to ensure that social service agencies and officials 
follow the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act.  See Ombudsperson for American Indian 
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In Europe, in contrast, programs and institutions with the sole mandate of 
addressing issues of race, ethnicity, and discrimination are rapidly expanding, driven 
by European Union mandates, and in particular by a Directive requiring member 
states to establish such institutions.75  Finland, for example, has long had an 
ombudsperson for foreigners but recently expanded that office to serve all ethnic 
minorities in response to the EU Directive.76  In addition, Germany has both a 
national and a Schleswig-Holstein regional commissioner for minorities;77 Sweden 
has an ombudsman against ethnic discrimination;78 the Czech Republic has a Council 
on National Minorities;79 and Hungary has a Parliamentary Commissioner for 
National and Ethnic Minority Rights.80
These trends present an interesting counterpoint to the overall pattern of the 
“boom in NHRIs in the 1980s and 1990s,” which “with a handful of exceptions… has 
occurred in the South.”81  The exceptions to this overall pattern are the new minority 
ombudsperson’s offices in Europe and the Commonwealth countries of Canada, 
Australia & New Zealand:  the regions that I found to be relatively involved with 
minority rights.82
Next, these regional differences correspond to some extent with the existence 
of regional legal frameworks encouraging certain sorts of protections.  Africa and 
Asia both lack any enforceable regional framework for minority protections and 
national human rights institution involvement in these issues is correspondingly weak.  
Families brochure (on file with author).  
75 See Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment 
Between Persons Irrespective of Racial or Ethnic Origin, art. 13.  (Official Journal L 180, 19/07/2000 
P. 0022-0026).
76 See EUMC Report, supra note __,at 41-44.  
77 See id. at 45-46.
78 See id. at 46-48.
79 See http://wtd.vlada.cz/files/rvk/rnm/zprava_mensiny_2001_en.pdf. 
80 See Lloydd & Morawa, supra note __, at 39.
81
  ICHRP report, supra note __, at 65; see also Volio, supra note __, at 5.
82 See id.
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In Mexico and Central and South America, where the only reported work with 
minority groups is solely with indigenous groups, there is some correlation between 
ratification of the ILO Convention No. 169 on indigenous peoples (a convention 
dominated by Latin American states) and the likelihood that a national human rights 
institution will report such work or have a program or office directed at indigenous 
groups.83  While the convention is not enforced by punitive measures, the ILO does 
make general observations on states parties’ implementation of the treaty.84 Finally, 
in Europe, there is an EU directive mandating development of anti-racism agencies, 
punitive measures for enforcing the directive, and numerous regional bodies with an 
interest in minority issues.  Correspondingly, states are rapidly adopting minority-
directed programs.85  The focus on indigenous groups in Canada, New Zealand and 
Australia and on anti-discrimination measures in the U.S. seem to be driven by 
domestic political realities, as there are no apparent regional legal regimes affecting 
their policies but significant internal political debate on these issues.86
There are also trends in the content of minority-directed programs.  Most have 
been focused on one of two issues: the accessibility of the institution’s general 
services to minority groups, or anti-discrimination measures.  Notably, both are issues 
that fit readily within the traditional liberal vision of minority rights, as discussed in 
83
 Of the thirteen states in the region that have ratified the convention, eight reported some minority-
directed programs, one did not, and there were three for which no information was available.  Of the 
seven countries that have not ratified the convention, only one reported minority-directed programs, 
three did not, and there were three for which no information was available.  The ILO Convention No. 
169 on indigenous rights is dominated by central and south American states in two senses:  the majority 
of states parties to the treaty are Central or South American (11 of 17 plus Mexico as #12 of 18), and 
more than half of the states in Central and South America are parties (12 of 20, or, counting Mexico, 11 
of 21)  See ILO website, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/ratifce.pl?C169, (last viewed Oct. 7, 2005).
84
 See ILO website, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm, last viewed Feb. 25, 2004.
85 See discussion at note __, supra. There are also European NGOs that support the development of 
minority national human rights institutions.  See European Centre for Minority Issues, Minority 
Ombudsperson Project Network Conference, Federal Ministry of the Interior, Berlin, 16-17 October 
2003, Conference Report (November 2003), available at ECMI website, www.ecmi.de
86
 Of course, these results do not indicate whether it is state interests that are driving the development 
of regional systems or vice versa.  Once in place, however, regional enforcement mechanisms may 
create independent incentives for state behavior that to some extent take on a life of their own.
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part A. (Of course, both are acceptable to, if insufficient for, liberal pluralists and 
communitarians as well.)
As to the first issue, a number of institutions have developed initiatives to 
increase awareness within the institutions of potential barriers to access for members 
of minority groups and to reduce or remove those barriers.  So, for example, the 
national human rights commission in India, which has high rates of illiteracy among 
certain minority groups, has adopted informal procedures for accepting complaints 
rather than requiring complaints to be filed in writing.87  Some institutions have 
undertaken publicity programs aimed at extending their reach beyond the urban 
centers into rural communities.  The Ugandan Human Rights Commission has 
broadcast information over the radio in local languages in an effort to reach rural and 
illiterate segments of the population.88 Representatives of the Mexican National
Commission for Human Rights have visited some indigenous areas to solicit and 
accept complaints directly.89
Another way of improving accessibility is to establish local and provincial 
offices.  Doing so may have synergetic effects.  At the most basic level, a single 
national office may be geographically inaccessible to most of the population, 
especially in states with substantial rural populations and poor transportation and 
communication.90  In countries with numerous minority groups, local offices are 
better placed to provide services directed at the particular groups in their area.  
Whereas the national office of the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative 
Justice in Ghana accepts complaints only in the country’s major languages, it hires 
87 See Sripati, supra note __, at 20.
88 See Uganda Human Rights Commission website, www.uhrc.org.
89 See Jorge Madrazo, New Policies on Human Rights in Mexico, in The International Ombudsman 
Anthology 337, 351-52 (1999). 
90 See Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission website, www.aihrc.org.af; Zambian Human 
Rights Commission website, http://www.sahrc.org.za/afr_sec_main.htm.
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speakers of local languages for its regional and district offices.91 Also, some 
institutions have hired local minority representatives for its staff or have given 
minority community leaders positions among the commission or ombudsperson
officials.92
At least one case study suggests that measures and programs specifically 
directed at local minority populations are at times effective not only because they are 
objectively more accessible but in part because they signal interest in and seriousness 
about addressing minority community concerns, establishing credibility with that 
community and increasing community members subjective willingness to approach 
the institution.93   However, if not staffed with minority peoples or supported by the 
community, such outreach can breed suspicion on the basis of past experiences of 
discrimination.94  And of course, such programs also run the risk of cabining minority 
concerns to only certain offices and officers, and reducing the accountability of the 
institution as a whole to minority groups.
Next, while many national human rights institutions may not make a priority 
of minority concerns or report programs directed at minority groups, few if any would 
exclude claims of affirmative government discrimination or oppression from their 
mandates, at least in principle (whereas other kinds of minority claims, such as those 
advocated by liberal pluralists and communitarians may or may not fall within 
individual institutions’ mandates).  If an institution does report work on substantive 
minority claims, it is most likely to be on discrimination issues.  Amongst these 
institutions, there is a striking contrast between those that deal with minority issues 
91 See Reif, supra note __, at 26.
92See Sripati, supra note __, at 13.  
93See Shannon Adair Williams, Human Rights in Theory and Practice: A Sociological Study of 
Aboriginal Peoples and the New Brunswick Human Rights Commission, 1967-1997, at 71-72, 85-86, 
& 93-95 (Masters thesis, Dept. of Sociology, University of New Brunswick 1999) (on file with author). 
94 See id; Kimm, supra note __, at 27.
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primarily when high profile cases arise but are unresponsive to daily complaints, and 
those that are reported to work steadily on everyday claims.  Carolyn Evans describes 
high profile investigations of violent conflicts targeting religious minorities by human 
rights commissions in the Philippines and India,95 and other commentators also note a 
similar focus on high profile claims to the exclusion of daily concerns in the work 
done by other Asian institutions.96
Apart from the issues of access and discrimination, a few national human 
rights institutions do address minority claims of the kind advocated in the new 
minority rights treaties and by liberal pluralists and communitarians: claims for 
protection of particular cultural rights, for example.  However, such claims are 
pursued almost exclusively by specialized institutions whose core mandate is work 
with minority groups, and who are backed by a legal framework establishing those 
rights in national law. The Parliamentary Commissioner for the Rights of National 
and Ethnic Minorities in Hungary, for example, enforces the constitutionally 
established rights of national minorities to practice their language and culture.97
In my discussions with officers of the Swedish and Hungarian minority 
ombudsman’s offices, each reported a sharp division in their work between the claims 
brought by different minority groups. Although indigenous groups in Sweden were 
entitled to sweeping cultural protections, claims from these groups were rare.  Instead, 
most claims were brought by members of immigrant groups concerning either 
discrimination or access to government social and economic benefits.98  Similarly, the 
95 See Carolyn Evans, Human Rights Commissions and Religious Conflict in the Asia-Pacific Region, 
53.3 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 713 , at text accompanying notes 73-102 (2004).
96 See Shameem, supra note __, at 662 (Fiji Human Rights Commission); ICHRP report, supra note 
__, at 25 (Malaysian Komnas Ham).
97 See IOI notes, supra note __. Hungary “recognizes certain minorities as constituent nationalities and 
gives them certain self-government rights,” and in respect of these rights, the Commissioner works on 
new legislation on minority protections and monitors implementation, inconsistencies, & violations.  
See Lloydd & Morawa, supra note __, at 39.  
98 See Interview with Anna Theodora Gunnarsdottir and Nils-Olof Berggren, Parliamentary 
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Hungarian ombudsperson reported that his work was divided between the claims of 
groups recognized as “national minorities,” who have a long-standing connection to 
Hungary, are entitled to certain protections for language and culture, and represent 
roughly 25% of claims, and the Roma, who have no such protections, face severe 
discrimination, seek socio-economic benefits from the government, and file 75% of 
claims.99
But minority-directed programs aimed at particular cultural practices are more 
likely to be targeting human rights violations within minority communities than 
defending minority interests against external threats.  Ghana’s Commission for 
Human Rights and Administrative Justice has taken on controversial practices such as 
witchcraft accusations and trokosi, a form of forced labor and sex slavery.100 The 
Mexican human rights commission has criticized tribal courts for failing to follow due 
process standards.101 Other commissions have challenged community practices such 
as child marriage and reviewed procedures in local and religious courts.102  Indeed, 
oversight of indigenous communities is the sole mandate of some institutions:  the 
Métis Settlement Ombudsman in a Canadian regional government institution 
established in 2003 solely to hear complaints of maladministration and conflicts of 
interest against the General Council of the Métis Settlements, an indigenous 
community granted some rights of autonomy and self-government by the Alberta 
government.103
Ombudsman’s Office of Sweden, at IOI Quebec Conference (Sep. 8, 2004) (notes on file with author) 
(hereafter “Gonnarsdottir & Berggren interview”).
99
 See IOI notes, supra note __.
100 See ICHRP Report, supra note __, at 16-17.
101 See id.
102 See  Amanda Whiting, Situating Suhakam: Human Rights Debates and Malaysia’s Human Rights 
Commission, 39 Stan. J. Int’l L. 59, 81 n. 182 (2003); Sripati, supra note __.
103 See Métis Settlements Ombudsman, 1st Annual Report for the period April 1, 2003 to March 31, 
2003, at 1 (on file with author) (hereafter “Métis report”); Métis Settlements General Council website, 
www.msgc.ca (last viewed Dec. 14, 2004); Catherine E. Bell, Contemporary Métis Justice (1999).
Minority Rights, Minority Wrongs –Page 33
Finally, in at least a few cases, ombudspersons’ offices have been established 
precisely to address acute ethnic tensions.  In Kosovo, the OSCE established an 
ombudsperson’s office in 1999 in the context of UN administration of the protectorate
that maintains the forced peace between Serbs and Albanians there.  In 2004, it 
created a Deputy Ombudsperson for minority communities to address the particular 
needs of the Serbs living separately in guarded enclaves.104  In Bosnia & 
Herzegovina, the Dayton Accords mandated establishment of a Human Rights 
Commission made up of a Human Rights Ombudsman to investigate human rights 
complaints and a Human Rights Chamber to hear cases.105     Northern Ireland is 
another example of this phenomenon.106
But in many severely divided states, national human rights institutions seem to 
play no role in addressing minority concerns at all.107  In Nigeria, for example, with 
its hundreds of ethnic groups and its notorious propensity for ethnic and religious 
conflict, the ombudsperson’s office reports no efforts to either reach minority 
populations or work on minority issues, and while the National Human Rights 
Commission lists numerous themes and goals on its website, discrimination, ethnic 
conflict, and minority rights are not among them.108 The Indonesian National Human 
Rights Commission has no resources directed to minority groups or concerns, nor 
even any branch offices to serve the numerous groups scattered along the nation’s 
104
 Interview with Legal Adviser, Kosovo Ombudsperson’s office (June 7, 2004) (notes on file with 
author); see also Paul R. Williams, supra note __, at 403. 
105 See J. David Yeager, The Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovna, 14 Int’l L. 
Perspectives 44, 45 (2004).
106 See Bryan, supra note __, at 247.
107
 “Severely divided states” refers to states that are either complexly divided, with their population 
divided amongst many groups and no clear majority group, or that have strong and often violent 
conflicts between groups, or both.  Complexly divided states tend to be in Africa & Asia and include 
Indonesia, Nepal, Nigeria, & Ethiopia, with many ethnic groups & languages. States with violent group 
conflicts include those of Eastern Europe, in addition to a number in Africa and Asia.  I do not include 
in this group, for example, the states of the Americas, which tend to have a clear majority group, and 
where outbursts of group conflict tend to be regional or local in nature.  See generally Horowitz, supra 
note __.
108 See Public Complaints commission of Nigeria annual report 2003 (on file with author); Nigerian 
Human Rights Commission website, www.nigeriarights.org (last viewed Mar. 6, 2005). 
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vast archipelago.109  The ethnic and religious divisions in Indonesia are of the utmost 
urgency, spurring not just political opposition and violent conflict, but even full scale 
war by separatist movements far from the capital.  Nonetheless, the commission has 
been notoriously uninvolved in these concerns, such that activists in Irian Jaya, where 
the commission has at least carried out a few high profile investigations, regard it as 
essentially a “foreign institution.”110 Sudan has both an ombudsperson’s office and an 
advisory commission on human rights in Khartoum.  These offices do not seem to 
have been available to the people of Darfur who claim that local police asked them for 
bribes and jailed them when they complained of others grazing on their land, events 
that were part of the build-up to the current violence there.111
3. Crucial Factors Limiting Minority Group Programs
a. International and Regional Legal Regimes
If what transitioning states are looking for in creating national human rights 
institutions is to gain political capital with the United Nations and other international 
institutions as much as to make strides in promoting human rights, then it is telling 
that the U.N. benchmarks for the success of these institutions do not mention minority 
rights. In 1993, the UN General Assembly endorsed the Paris Principles, which set 
minimum standards for national human rights institutions’ functions, authority, 
resources, and independence from government influence.112 The United Nations and 
other international organizations use the Principles as the primary test for certifying 
109 See ICHRP report, supra note __, at 28-29.   
110 Id. at 33.
111
 See Ombudpersons links page, http://www.ombudsman.bc.ca/links/intl_ombuds/index.htm; Tim 
Judah, The Stakes in Darfur, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS 12 (Jan. 13, 2005).
112 See Principles relating to the status and functioning of national institutions for protection and 
promotion of human rights (Oct. 1991) (endorsed by UN Commission on Human Rights, resolution 
1992/54 (March 1992) and by UN General Assembly, resolution A/RES/48/134 (Dec. 20, 1993) 
(hereafter “Paris Principles”).  The United Nations has supported the development of national human 
rights institutions since the 1960s.  It has sponsored a series of international meetings of representatives 
of national human rights institutions, and various guidelines and principles have emerged from these 
meetings, including the Paris Principles. See UNHCR Fact Sheet, supra note __.
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agencies as national human rights institutions and for judging their competence and 
independence.113
The Paris Principles are not intended to and do not offer incentives for 
institutions to work closely with minority groups or on minority rights.  In short, 
although the Principles do make reference to discrimination, pluralism, and 
“vulnerable groups,” their requirements can be met without any involvement in 
minority issues or with minority groups at all.114  Furthermore, UN assistance 
programs tend to be generic, untailored to particular countries, much less to work with 
particular minority groups.115 From the perspective of transitioning states’ interest in 
demonstrating measurable progress toward establishing independent, effective human 
rights institutions, therefore, the UN benchmarks give them little reason to invest in 
institutional capacity to address minority concerns.  Indeed, to the contrary: in order 
to gain the hoped-for economic and political benefits for compliance with 
international norms, states must put the limited resources they are willing to allocate 
to national human rights institutions into the UN-identified agenda. 
113
 For example, compliance with the Principles is a prerequisite for participation in the Asia-Pacific 
Forum, a regional association of national human rights institutions.  See Evans, supra note __. at text 
accompanying notes 10-12.   Similarly, the National Human Rights Institution Forum uses the Paris 
Principles as the sole criterion for its accreditation ratings. See National Human Rights Institution 
Forum website, http://www.nhri.net/default.asp?PID=276&DID=0 (last viewed Feb. 15, 2005).  
Scholars also treat the Principles as the first measure of a national human rights institution’s 
legitimacy, analyzing the structure of the institution against the Principles’ requirements. See 
Evans,supra note __, at text accompanying notes 8-60; Sripati, supra note __, at 10-13; Building 
Democratic Institutions, supra note __, at, 4 & 24.
114
 At first, it seems promising that the Principles require that the “pluralist representation of the social 
forces” of a state be represented in its national human rights institutions, but minority groups are not 
among the examples of the relevant “social forces” listed, which instead focus on representatives of 
segments of civil society.  The Principles also suggest that human rights institutions should associate 
with NGOs that, among other things, work with vulnerable groups and that it should promote human 
rights by, among other things, publicizing efforts to end race discrimination.  But these proposals each 
come as the last in a laundry list of possible subjects for publicity and association, and do not require 
the institutions to take any particular steps or to advance any programs of its own.  See Paris Principles, 
supra note __. The Principles are a limited tool in other respects as well. See LINDA C. REIF, THE 
OMBUDSMAN, GOOD GOVERNANCE AND THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 394 (2004).  
Case studies suggest that the Principles’ markers of independence do not necessarily correlate with 
effectiveness. See Evans, supra note __, at 713, fn. 33; ICHRP Report, supra note __, at 3.
115 See Tsekos, supra note __, at 22.
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Recently, there have been indications of an increasing recognition of the 
relevance of minority group interests, both within the UN and at international 
meetings of national human rights institutions.116 In particular, some of the 
declarations that have emerged from these meetings have acknowledged the tensions 
between minority groups and human rights claims, by raising the issue of how and to 
what extent human rights should be adapted to local cultures, at times gingerly and at 
times with a sense of grievance against cultural imperialism, but without reaching any 
consensus on the question.117 These developments highlight another fundamental 
limitation of the Paris Principles: the document’s approach is both formal and 
formulaic, taking the legal texts of human rights instruments as its foundation, treating 
the content of human rights as unproblematic, and viewing the promotion of human 
rights as a one-way transfer of these values from the UN system to receptive national 
governments.  As such, it lacks any contextual framework acknowledging the variety 
of national and ethnic settings in which national human rights institutions operate or 
the potential for the institution to be caught in conflicts between human rights-defined 
interests.
In contrast, it is notable that the most dramatic shift toward minority concerns, 
the establishment of ombudspersons’ offices for minority groups in Europe, has been
driven by precisely the opposite legal reality: an EU directive on racial and ethnic 
discrimination issued in 2000 requires states to establish independent institutions to 
assist with complaints, carry out surveys, and provide reports and recommendations 
116 See, e.g., Copenhagen Declaration, ¶¶  1(b) & 3(b)-(d), (Apr. 13, 2002), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/copendec.htm (last visited May 10, 2004); UNHCR Fact Sheet,
supra note __.
117 See Rabat Declaration, ¶¶  6-8 (Ap. 15, 2000), available at www.unhcr.ch (last viewed May 13, 
2004); Bangkok Declaration, ¶¶ 7-11 & 22-23 (Apr. 7, 1993), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu5/wcbangk.htm#I (last visited May 22, 2004). 
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on combating discrimination.118  This is not a mere suggestion to member states.  
States must report on their progress in implementing the directive at regular intervals, 
and they can ultimately be brought to the European Court of Justice and ordered to 
pay damages for failure to comply.119 In addition, the European Union has set high 
standards in minority protections for countries seeking entry to the Union.  In order to 
gain the economic, political and social benefits of accession, those countries are 
meeting the EU standards both with substantive guarantees for their minorities and 
with human rights institutions designed to ensure them. 120
The influence of other regional institutions and systems, such as the Inter-
American Human Rights system and the African Commission on Human Rights, upon 
the involvement of national human rights institutions in minority issues bears no 
comparison to the European Union.  While these systems do promote some minority 
and indigenous rights in principle, they do not require that member states establish 
national human rights institutions to address these issues, much less enforce such 
requirements with punitive mechanisms.121
b. Limited Political Purposes and Resources
There are also a number of political and institutional reasons that a national 
human rights institution might not wish to involve itself with minority concerns.  In 
118 See Directive 2000/43/EC, supra note __, art. 13; see also Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 
November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation 
(Official Journal L 303, 02/12/2000 P. 0016-0022); Migrants, minorities and legislation: Documenting 
legal measures and remedies against discrimination in 15 members states of the European Union, 
Report submitted by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) on behalf of 
the European Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) (December 2004) (hereafter “EUMC 
report”).
119 See Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 226-28 (signed Mar. 25, 1957), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/treaties/en/entoc05.htm (last viewed Mar. 6, 2005).  
120 See, “Copenhagen Criteria,” European Council in Copenhagen 21-22 June 1993, Conclusions of the 
Presidency, SN/180/1/93 Rev 1, at 13; Open Society Institute, Developments in the EU Accession 
Process, 2 European Yearbook on Minority Affairs 1 (2003).  
121 See African Charter on Human Rights, art. 26 & 45; Inter-American Convention on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms.  In Asia, the only regional support for the development of national human 
rights institutions is a voluntary association, the Asia-Pacific Forum.  See Asia Pacific Forum website, 
www.asiapacificforum.com (last viewed Feb. 10, 2005).
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some cases, the political purposes for establishing a national human rights institution
has been to forestall criticism of human rights practices with a toothless institution, so 
that the last thing decision- makers want is to make the institution more accessible or 
effective.122 While national human rights institutions are officially empowered to 
carry out investigations against their governments, some lack the institutional clout or 
resources to do so.  A number of national human rights institutions do not exercise the 
far-reaching powers they possess on paper but limit their activities primarily to less 
controversial and less resource-intensive educational programs and public awareness 
campaigns.123 Furthermore, an institution may face a truly daunting array of human 
rights abuses by its government, so that minority concerns, however serious and 
fundamental, may simply not be its highest priority.  Even if such an institution is 
operating in good faith and receiving government cooperation, it may be still in the 
early stages of institution-building, lacking the capacity for extended projects or 
programs.124
As one would expect, it is states with greater resources, both financial and 
political, that tend to have established more elaborate and extensive programs, 
including programs aimed at minority groups. Thus, for example, although Australia’s 
indigenous population is relatively small, it has designated a human rights 
commissioner to promote the rights of its aboriginal people.125  In contrast, in 
Malaysia, where society is polarized along ethno-religious lines and these differences 
are built in to the basic structures of government, the Malaysian Human Rights 
122See Promotion, supra note __, at 278; Whiting, supra note __, at 75 & 96 (Malaysia).
123The Benin Human Rights Commission, for example, as of 2000 had primarily carried out trainings 
and workshops.  See Human Rights Watch Report, Protectors or Pretenders? Government Human 
Rights Commissions in Africa (2001), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/africa/contents.html (last viewed Mar. 7, 2005) (hereafter “African 
HRC report”).
124 See Marten Oosting, The Ombudsman and his Environment, in The International Ombudsman 
Anthology 1, 8-9 (1999)..  
125 See Australian Human Rights Commission website, www.hreoc.gov.au/social_justice/index.htm
(last viewed Oct. 10, 2004).  
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Commission has no commissioner dedicated to these issues.  Rather, it has kept silent 
when faced with complaints of infringement of religious rights, limiting itself to 
private hearings and occasional neutral statements urging inter-faith dialogue.126
Indeed, in some cases there tends to be an inverse relationship at work: the more 
central and significant minority concerns are to a state, the more resources and 
political clout it would take to address them, and so the less likely they are to be 
addressed.127
There are also reasons that are tied in to the nature of the minority community-
state relationship and the relationship between minority and human rights.  The 
national human rights institution is inherently a national, state entity.  Although its 
mandate may be investigation of government abuse, it is nonetheless structured by 
and for the purposes of the government.  As a political matter, the national human 
rights institution may perceive itself or may be perceived as being a part of the 
national government in a national – local conflict of the sort that drives many minority 
rights concerns.  A national institution, located in the capital city and created by 
national authorities, may not have an understanding of or sympathy for minority
views, particularly as such concerns are held by distant, rural populations and 
particularly as they implicate other government interests.  By the nature of the 
appointment process, the members of national human rights institutions are likely to 
be urban political and social elites with development-oriented agendas that view 
minority concerns as ultimately subservient to the greater good of the state interest in 
economic and social progress.  In short, the national human rights institution may well 
be a political or national agent – whether by political motive or merely as an effect of 
126 See Evans, supra note __, at text accompanying notes 61-72.
127
 The International Council on Human Rights Policy has also noted this dynamic in its review of the 
work of national human rights institutions in general.  See ICHRP Report, supra note __, at 1.
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its members, structure and overall design – rather than a neutral body in interactions 
with minority groups.
Finally, beyond these questions of institutional identity and political 
involvement, the institution may also face a conflict within its mandate to promote 
human rights.  Minority claims may conflict with other human rights agendas.  
Neither the Paris Principles nor other aspects of the institution’s mandate direct it as 
to how to balance competing rights, or even seem to acknowledge that such conflicts 
might arise.  
Without becoming bogged down in an analysis of the formidable financial and 
political difficulties that national human rights institutions functioning in transitional 
states face, there are certainly reasons enough that these young agencies might not yet 
be ready or able to take on the complexities of minority group claims.  But when 
national human rights institutions do nonetheless grapple with minority concerns, 
their experiences are revealing.
C. Implications for Democracy Theory of Minority Rights
National human rights institutions’ limited involvement in minority concerns
can be explained at least in part by the failures of resources, of political will, or of 
relevant regional incentives discussed above. But this pattern may signal something 
else as well: that the current understandings of minority rights are not entirely 
applicable in the places they are being ignored.  Echoing Leslye Obiora, perhaps
“what is often mistaken for apathy might actually be the most poignant commentary 
on the limitations of the approach.”128  At a minimum, this pattern ought to spur us to 
consider what limitations there may be on the direct transplantation of minority rights 
and democracy theory.  
128 See Obiora, supra note __, at 656.
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In severely divided states, the relationships between ethnic and religious 
groups are fundamental to the nature and stability of the state.  Accordingly, the 
decisions that a newly developing state makes about how to accommodate those
groups in its legal and political system are among the most important for its success, 
and for its survival.  But, as most severely divided states are only now in the process 
of democratic transition, theories of the role of minority rights in a democracy have
been developed primarily in the context of longstanding liberal democracies that are 
less severely divided.129 Although each of the theorists discussed in section A above 
came to different conclusions about the proper balance of liberal and minority rights 
within the state, all “took for granted” (as Kymlicka puts it) in staking their positions, 
that the state in question was a well-established liberal democracy and that the 
fundamental tension to be resolved in considering minority claims was that between 
those claims and the liberal values at the core of the state’s identity.130
Do the theories formulated in these distant contexts provide a good framework 
for managing multiculturalism within new democracies?   The theorists themselves 
offer only highly qualified responses to this question,131 and critics have pointed to 
extensive social, political, economic and historical differences as discrediting efforts 
to apply these theories out of their original context.132 Whether these theories are 
129 See Will Kymlicka & Magda Opalski, Introduction, in Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported? Western 
Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe 1, 1 (Will Kymlicka & Magda Opalski, eds. 
2001) (hereafter “Liberal Pluralism”).
130
 Kymlicka, Preface & Acknowledgments, in Liberal Pluralism, supra note __, at xii (hereafter 
“Preface”)
131 See e.g., Preface, supra note __, at xii;  Will Kymlicka, Nation-Building & Minority Rights:
Comparing Africa and the West, in Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa 54, 54 (Bruce Berman, Dickson 
Eyoh & Will Kymlicka, eds. 2004) (hereafter “Nation-Building”)).
132 See e.g., Will Kymlicka, Reply and Conclusion, in Liberal Pluralism, supra note _, at 347, 347-348 
(summarizing Central and East European scholars’ critiques of his position, including concerns about 
the role of elites in defining minority interests, oppressive minorities, and risks to the process of 
democratic development); Nation-Building, supra note __, at 64 (considering African scholars’ 
critiques, including fundamentally different patterns of ethnic groups and interactions).
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relevant to these new contexts remains an open question.133 It is also a vital question, 
because these theories are being actively exported to new democracies, in the form to 
the treaties, constitutions, and EU obligations discussed above, and in the form of the 
national human rights institutions that are the subject of this article.134
The experiences of national human rights institutions support the views of 
those who suggest that these theoretical conceptions of minority rights do not translate 
directly to new democracies, and particularly to severely divided ones. A common 
critique of these theories as applied to transitioning states and emerging democracies 
has been that because these groups take the characteristics of the liberal democratic 
state as a fixed point, their focus has been on the tension between accommodating 
minority groups and protecting liberal rights, and not on the tensions that minority 
claims present vis-à-vis other interests of the state.135 The views and experiences of 
national human rights institutions suggest that, indeed, this focus has caused theorists 
to marginalize other concerns that are central to newly democratizing states.  Minority 
rights are certainly a useful rhetorical and legal device for rebutting state intervention, 
just as human rights provide a useful rhetorical and legal device for a state looking for 
a reason to intervene in minority communities.  But the experiences of national human 
rights institutions suggest that the “problem cases” that have always existed on the 
fringes of democratic theory and positive law are no longer the exception, but rather, 
are becoming the most important, significant and frequent minority claims that 
national human rights institutions face in reality.
1. Core Interests of the State
133 See Kymlicka & Opalski, supra note __, at 1 (“Surprisingly, there has been very little written 
exploring this question.”); Preface, supra note __, at xv-xvi . 
134 See Kymlicka & Opalski, supra note __, at 3.
135 See generally Liberal Pluralism, supra note __.
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First, as suggested above, democracy theory overstates the extent to which 
liberal rights are the core interest that the state wishes to protect and with which it 
identifies. This became apparent at the International Ombudsman Institute meeting in 
September 2004, during a group discussion of the ombudsperson’s proper role in 
promoting minority rights.  While the discussion began with classic liberal 
restatements of minority interests as extensions of liberal interests (“the 
Ombudsman’s traditional role of protecting citizens from excesses in government 
power means that we have particular responsibilities towards those who are 
vulnerable or marginalised”136), it quickly shifted to other concerns: minorities’ 
claims to socio-economic equity (from the Argentinean ombudsperson),137 the role of 
immigration and international relations (from the Swedish and European 
ombudsmen),138 and minorities’ effect on national identity (from the Greek 
ombudsperson).139
These varying concerns are not surprising, given the varying roles minorities 
have played in the lives of states, and the differences in self-perceptions of identity 
amongst these states.  Governments in Central and East Europe tend to view minority 
issues as a national security concern more than as a threat to liberal values, in light of 
the violent inter-ethnic conflicts there.140  In Africa, not only are national security and 
stability crucial issues, but few states enforce liberal rights consistently, and while 
ethnic communities flourish on the social level, in the political realm ethnicity most 
often is deployed as a form of patronage.141 The European Center on Racism and 
136 See Bruce Barbour, The Ombudsman and Today’s Demographic Realities (on file with author); see 
also Dr. Jenö Kaltenbach, Special protection requirement of minorities (EOI-conference Budapest, 10 
May 2004) (on file with author).
137See Dr. Jorge Luis Maiorano, Workshop 2: Social Condition, at 7-9 (on file with author).
138 See IOI notes, supra note __ (panel session Sep. 7, 2004).
139 See IOI notes, supra note __ (panel session Sep. 7, 2004).
140 See Western Political Theory, supra note __, at 66-67.
141 See Dickson Eyoh, Liberalization and the Politics of Difference in Cameroon, in Ethnicity and 
Democracy, supra note __, at 96, 98-99; Peter Ekeh, Individuals’ Basic Securiyt Needs and the Limits 
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Xenophobia suggests that historical differences in patterns of immigration have 
shaped not only the distribution of minorities within states but also “public 
perceptions of their place in society and hence, public policies vis-à-vis these 
minorities.”142 Finally, while many new democracies have guaranteed liberal rights in 
principle, many are all too illiberal in practice.143
Liberal and communitarian democratic theory’s misplaced assumption of and 
focus on the state’s liberal identity can be misleading when conflicts arise between 
minority groups and the state that are, at least ostensibly about liberal values. If 
applied uncritically, its principles may place too much credence in a state’s liberal 
rhetoric, mistaking talk for actual devotion to those rights, overestimating the extent 
to which the state actually protects liberal rights (especially vis-à-vis its minorities), 
and underestimating the extent to which the state is willing to use those rights as a 
weapon against minority groups without protecting them itself.  In Mexico, case 
studies of interactions between several indigenous groups and the Mexican 
government illustrate these concerns.  The Mexican government (and in at least one 
case, its national human rights commission as well) have criticized indigenous legal 
systems for failing to ensure due process guarantees in their internal legal systems. 
There is no doubt that in fact due process norms are not followed in the communities’ 
courts: they are employing their own standards and procedures for judgment that do 
not correspond to liberal ideals.  But the Tlapanec, Tierra y Libertad and Zinacantán 
communities object to using the state’s legal system not only on grounds of autonomy 
or of cultural rights, but also because the Mexican government has itself failed to
guarantee crucial elements of due process, such as providing translators for non-
of Democracy in Africa, in Ethnicity and Democracy, supra note __, at 22. 
142 See EUMC report, supra note __, at 6.
143 See Zakaria, supra note __.
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Spanish speaking defendants from their communities.144 While the Mexican 
government deploys the language of liberal rights in arguing that indigenous 
autonomy must be limited, it does so as a rhetorical tactic, inviting us to compare 
indigenous realities to liberal ideals rather than, as we should, to the realities of state
interests.  
As well as overestimating the importance of liberal values to the state, 
democracy theorists may also overestimate the risk of minorities creating “illiberal 
enclaves” within the state, in the sense of deliberately creating systemic inequalities
within their communities.  There is an intriguing pattern in the claims filed with 
certain Canadian regional institutions: while some human rights claims by tribal 
community members against tribal government institutions did concern systematic 
gender discrimination or other systemic problems, many complained of simple 
favoritism, nepotism, or abuse of power of the barest sort. For example, most of the 
formal complaints received by the Métis Settlement Ombudsman in 2003 regarding 
Métis Settlement leadership were such claims of nepotism, conflicts of interest, or 
other failures of professional conduct.145  Similarly, while the New Brunswick 
Ombudsman did receive some complaints of discrimination against tribal leadership, 
many of its complaints concerned simple abuse of political authority to favor friends 
and disfavor rivals.146 While such problems are obviously undesirable, they are 
neither inherent to minority systems nor different in kind than the problems that arise 
within liberal democratic systems.  
144 See Shannon Speed & Jane F. Collier, Limiting Indigenous Autonomy in Chiapas, Mexico: The 
State Government’s Use of Human Rights 22 Human Rts. Q. 877, 884-85 (2000); Martin Hébert & 
Caroline Aubry, Linguistic Competence, Cultural Categories and Discrimination: Indigenous People 
before the Mexican Court System 11 (forthcoming 2005).  
145
 Métis Settlements Ombudsman Report 2003, supra note __, at 10.
146 See Williams, supra note __, at 55-56; 
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Accordingly, theorists might also be misjudging the extent to which any 
human rights concerns that arise within minority communities will represent 
fundamental conflicts between liberal and minority values.  Because nepotism and 
favoritism do not implicate deeply valued community principles or traditional 
practices, and indeed often violate community values and customs as well as human 
rights values and customs, these claims are likely to  represent, not true clashes of 
values, but rather, the divergence of political reality from both sets of values, minority 
and liberal.147
This is not to say of course that there is not a risk of fundamental conflicts 
between liberal and minority community values, for of course there are myriad 
examples of irreducible conflicts, the most commonly noted being entrenched gender 
discrimination.148  The Canadian cases could prove to be exceptional.  But they do 
raise the intriguing possibility that the traditional focus on liberal rights as the point of 
conflict between minority groups and the state may tempt us to look to fundamental 
differences between minority and liberal values for the cause of conflicts, rather than 
considering other possibilities.
2. Categories of Minority Groups
In addition to mischaracterizing the interest of the state as a predominantly 
liberal one, democracy theory places too much weight on the historicity and 
authenticity of the group’s relation to the state as the basis for the legitimacy of its 
claims, and as the criterion for distinguishing between groups. In democratic theory 
and positive law, recognized minority groups fall into three major categories: 
147
 In a similar vein, Makau wa Mutua argues that human rights violations by African state leaders 
often are not in pursuit of alternative visions of the good but represent mere abuses of power for 
power’s sake or private benefit.  See Makau wa Mutua, The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural 
Fingerprint, 35 Va. J. Int’l L. 339, 374 (1995)
148
 Joan Kimm, A Fatal Conjunction: Two Laws, Two Cultures 18-19 (2004) (violence against women 
in Australian Aboriginal communities).
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indigenous groups who were once hegemonic in their territory and who were 
displaced by the current state or its predecessor,149 other long-standing “national 
minority” groups who have long co-existed within the state,150 and new immigrant 
groups.151   The implication of this typology is that these differences in historical 
relationship are a good descriptor of the group’s interests vis-à-vis the state, a 
correspondingly good predictor of the nature of the group’s claims, and a principled 
basis for differential treatment by the state.152 This basic typology is also expressed in 
the treaties and constitutional protections for minority groups, and thus law and theory 
feed on and drive each other in framing these concerns.153 National human rights 
institutions are, accordingly, also working with some version of this typology, as 
expressed by or modified in their state’s constitutions and treaty obligations.
149 See discussion regarding the definition of the term “indigenous,” supra note__.  Kymlicka treats 
indigenous groups as a subcategory of national minority groups, but I list them here as a separate 
category because they are treated separately by many other commentators and by international law, and 
because Kymlicka himself regards indigenous groups as having both unique claims and unique 
justifications for those claims, as compared to non-indigenous national minorities.  See Will Kymlicka, 
Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe, in Liberal Pluralism, supra note __, 
at 23-31 (hereafter “Western Political Theory”).
150
 While most writers would include as “national minorities” all long-standing minority groups within 
the state (as I describe it in the text), some would limit this group only to splinter groups associated 
with other states, e.g, Greeks but not Kurds in Turkey, and Hungarians but not Silesians in Poland. See 
Aukerman, supra note __, at 1027.
151
 This group may be further subdivided, however, to reflect the differing claims of different kinds of 
immigrants.  See Nation-Building, supra note __, at 59-61.
152
 In brief, this typology focuses on distinctiveness, authenticity, continuity and consent as crucial 
characteristics determining the viability of claims for group recognition and rights.  Indigenous groups 
are expected to present an identity and worldview that is comprehensively different than that of the 
state and to make claims focused on cultural protection through substantial territorial autonomy and 
control of traditional lands.  The philosophical basis for their claim is supposed to be an authentic and 
continuous tradition that predates and survives the state and a lack of consent to be governed by the 
state.  Other national minorities are anticipated to present an identity and culture that is distinct from 
the state’s, although not as different as indigenous groups, and to present claims primarily for 
protection of those distinct characteristics, and perhaps for some degree of territorial autonomy.  The 
justification for their claims is also described as the authenticity and continuity of their distinctive 
tradition, but it is expected to be more limited in scope and more consonant with the state’s own 
traditions. Immigrants are acknowledged to present identities with a wide range of levels of difference 
in characteristics, but they are regarded as having abandoned claims to territorial autonomy and to a 
continuous cultural tradition by virtue of their decisions to migrate to other cultures.  For a full 
introduction to the topic, see TIERNEY, supra note __; TULLY, supra note __; Western Political Theory,
supra note __.
153 See Andreas Føllesdal, Minority Rights: A Liberal Contractualist Case, in Do We Need Minority 
Rights? 59-60 (J. Räikka ed. 1996). 
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No one has ever claimed that this typology is perfect; advocates have always 
acknowledged the existence of problem cases on the margins.154   Nonetheless, the 
typology has persisted, perhaps as much because it is effective in limiting the groups 
that are entitled to rights on a basis that is difficult for them to manipulate (history), as 
because it is a useful or descriptive one.155
But in new democracies and severely divided societies, the problem cases in 
this typology move from the margins to center stage: they are the majority of cases 
instead of the few. In some new democracies the kinds of groups that have always 
formed democratic theory’s problem cases have been and continue to be more 
numerous and conflict-ridden than those in the established democracies where this 
typology was developed. As mentioned above, the Hungarian Ombudsman for Ethnic 
and National Minorities receives 75% of his claims from the Roma, who have long 
been considered a “problem case” for the typology, as they are not readily categorized 
as indigenous, national minorities or immigrants, nor do their claims readily fit the 
simple categories of non-discrimination, territorial autonomy, or purely cultural 
rights.156
Furthermore, In many African and Asian states, many or all ethnic groups 
might equally lay claim to indigenous or national minority status.  In such states, this 
characteristic provides no basis for distinguishing between, limiting, or even 
154
 Some groups do not fit the categories neatly: African-Americans cannot readily be characterized 
either as national minorities or as immigrants. Other groups fit their category neatly in a formal sense, 
but the reality of their circumstances belies the core characteristics of the category nonetheless; for 
example, refugees, who have not chosen to abandon their own cultures and therefore do not lend 
themselves to the argument that they have consented to assimilation by voluntarily migrating.  
155
 Mark Rosen also argues that a concern with limiting the number of beneficiaries underlies 
Kymlicka’s distinction between national minorities and other groups in particular.  See Mark D. Rosen, 
Liberalism and Illiberalism, 12 J. Contemp. L. Issues 803, 823 (2002).
156
 IOI notes, supra note __ (Sep. 7, 2004 panel discussion.
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predicting the kinds of interests that a group will posit in its relationship to the state.  
Here the typology is simply irrelevant.157
In severely divided societies, there are more likely to be groups with 
unquestionably venerable historicity and authenticity, but who nonetheless present 
problematic claims.  For example, the position of the formerly dominant minorities in 
Eastern Europe vis-à-vis formerly dominated majorities defies the analysis of liberal 
and communitarian theory.  In Kosovo, the ombudsperson’s reference to “the 
minority” inevitably means reference to the Serbs, with whom the majority Kosovar
Albanians were engaged in violent conflict only a few years ago, and who were 
themselves the majority only a few years ago.158 Similarly, for the human rights 
institutions of the Baltic states, the minority is the Russian population, many of whom 
came to the region while it was under Soviet rule.159  The claims of these once 
dominant national minorities to protection of the language and culture may be 
formally identical to those of other national minorities in other states, but the 
philosophical justifications for those claims and the political and social reaction that 
the ombudsperson’s offices face in addressing them are quite different.  For these 
severely and at times violently divided societies, the question is not whether these 
groups have maintained authentic and continuous traditions, but whether traditions 
that have been forcibly imposed by one group upon another can or should be secured 
thereafter.
Furthermore, it appears that the number of problem cases are increasing.  
Ethnic identities persist even as internal cultural traditions are rapidly changing and 
157
 Many have noted the limits on this typology, in particular, the notion that each category is truly 
descriptive only in a certain area of the world, so that groups in North and South America and Oceania 
most neatly fit the indigenous category, which is progressively less useful in Europe, Asia and Africa.  
See e.g., Aukerman, supra note __, at 1044-46.
158 See Kosovo Ombudsman Annual Report 2003 (on file with author).  
159 See Ulziibayar Vangansuren, The Institution of the Ombudsman in Former Communist Countries 
(2002).
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being reshaped by interaction with other groups and with international influences.160
This phenomenon is of course not unique to severely divided societies. In Canada, the 
Métis have long presented a “problem case” in that their ethnic heritage is a mix of 
indigenous and immigrant peoples. Recently they have begun developing joint forms 
of governance and adjudication in cooperation with the regional Alberta government, 
based in part on their own customs and in part on the customs of the state.161  In 
Mexico, indigenous groups have formed new local legal and political systems that 
mix indigenous and non-indigenous forms of government.162 In Europe, political lines 
are shifting, and ombudspersons there are increasingly receiving claims from 
foreigners and migrants, seeking to define and make use of changes in their status as 
the EU consolidates, leaving them no longer immigrants, but not national minorities 
or indigenous groups either.163 In complexly divided societies with hundreds of 
ethnic groups, and in transitioning states engaged in rapid processes of social and 
political change, these blended peoples and systems are becoming the norm, not the 
exception. 
Wherever groups reshape themselves and their traditions but nonetheless 
maintain some separate ethnic identity, they pose challenges not just to the typology, 
but to the fundamental concepts of democratic theory.  For some of these groups defy 
easy categorization precisely because their characteristics and concerns belie the 
philosophical justifications that underlie those categories. In such cases, it will be 
hazardous to rely on authenticity or the historical relationship of the group to the state 
to define the legitimacy or nature of its claims. 
160 See generally Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (1985).
161 See Métis Settlements Ombudsman, 1st Annual Report for the period April 1, 2003 to March 31, 
2003, at 1 (on file with author) (hereafter “Métis report”); Métis Settlements General Council website, 
www.msgc.ca (last viewed Dec. 14, 2004); Catherine E. Bell, Contemporary Métis Justice (1999).
162 See Speed & Collier, supra note __, at 884-85; Hebert & Aubry, supra note __, at 1-3.
163 See Gonnarsdottir & Berggren interview, supra note __.
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3. Socio-economic C laims, Equity, and Limited Resources
Liberal and communitarian theorists may also be underestimating the 
importance of socio-economic concerns, claims for equity rather than equality, and 
limited resources in the minority – state struggle for power and control.  First, some 
claims by minority groups against external authorities may be better understood as 
socio-economic claims or collective claims for substantive equity rather than liberal 
claims for autonomy or procedural equality. This is true, first of all, even in the states 
in which the theorists are based.  In her case study of the New Brunswick Human 
Rights Commission, Shannon Williams was informed by local Native Americans that 
they were reluctant to pursue claims through the commission in part because they did 
not view investigation and remedying of their individual claims of discrimination 
against other individuals as addressing the systemic problems they observed:
“cases of discrimination [are] treated as isolated events and removed 
from the economic and social causes of inequity.  As Aboriginal critics 
observe, the discrimination experienced by Native people is by its 
nature social, and is based on collective identities and status.  
Reluctance to pursue the occurrence of discrimination in broader social 
contexts owing to limited resources, narrow legislative mandates or lack 
of organization will contributes to the perception that human rights 
codes are impotent measures for achieving social justice.”164
In accounts of human rights conflicts with minority groups in Africa, this 
disjunct between the socio-economic equity concerns of the minority group and the 
equality and freedom concerns of human rights advocates is even more 
pronounced.165 In human rights activists’ descriptions of their efforts to raise concerns 
about unequal gender norms and harmful traditional practices within minority 
communities, repeatedly the women who are the members of those communities
characterize their concerns first and foremost as demands for social and economic
164
 Williams, supra note __, at 126.  Indeed, a number of the claims brought to the commission 
concerned basic living conditions and economic status rather than discrimination, which is the 
commission’s mandate.  See id. at 51-77.
165 See Ekoh, supra note __.
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goods; and repeatedly, human rights activists brush aside those claims to emphasize 
instead the need for gender equality.  In a particularly acute example of these 
fundamentally different conceptions of the good, Leti Volpp tells the story of 
filmmakers traveling in Africa to make a film opposing female genital cutting 
practices.  While visiting a community, they asked a group of women about their 
feelings on the subject.  In response, the women explained that what they really 
needed was a truck to carry their produce to the market.166  This is not a story of a 
conflict between Western liberal values and minority cultural values (as female 
genital cutting is usually characterized), but of a clash between Western liberal values 
and minority socio-economic claims.  Minority groups may not regard their concerns
as cultural or liberal, but rather as a demand for equity, for a share of the tangible 
goods of society.167
Liberal theorists’ tendencies to emphasize the liberty and recognition aspects 
of minority claims and to minimize the socio-economic aspects may reflect those 
theorists’ efforts to minimize the nature of the conflicts between minority claims and 
liberal rights, and thereby to provide for the maximum possible range of acceptable 
(to them) minority claims.  As discussed above, states will generally recognize, and 
courts will generally enforce, only those minority rights that can be characterized as 
individual rights, not collective ones.  The more a claim resembles a traditional liberal 
claim for freedom and procedural equality, rather than a socio-economic or group 
claim, the more likely the plaintiff is to be granted standing and the claim is to be
166
 Volpp, supra note __, at 1208-09.  
167
 Interviewing women in Nigeria on behalf of the World Bank, Leslye Obioria recounts that many 
“seemed confounded by the conceptualization of gender equality in human rights discourses.  … they 
extolled respect as a more realistic paradigm for ordering specific social relations. …  educated, elite, 
and urban women were more inclined to subscribe to an equality-base discourse, while women in rural 
areas had more of a tendency to lament the paucity of resources.  …  Arguably, the rural perspective 
suggests hat it may be somewhat facile to quarrel over who does the dishes after dinner when dinner is 
a fast-disappearing routine in many rural households.”  Obiora, supra note __, at 652.
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found justiciable. However, in cases where the essence of the claim is in fact 
collective or focused on equity, the trade-off for this justiicability is an essential 
mischaracterization of the nature of the claim itself.168  Another trade-off is in the 
available remedy: the remedy for an individual discrimination claim is likely to be 
more limited than the remedy that would be necessary to redress a claim for collective 
socio-economic benefits.  
Theorists also tend to give short shrift to the limits on state power and capacity 
that make effective enforcement of any rights, liberal or minority, a pipe dream for 
many new democracies. In some states, government infrastructure has not infiltrated 
very far beyond the capital city, and even liberal freedoms, well-established in 
principle, are at the whim of local officials. The lists of rights promised in the new 
minority treaties require programs that are well beyond the capacities of states with 
limited resources, and especially states with numerous disparate groups.  For example, 
Adeno Addis notes that “many countries, especially developing countries, are faced 
not with two or three, but with dozens of languages.  Under those circumstances, it is 
likely to be financially prohibitive and administratively chaotic to attempt to give 
equal status to all languages that are spoken in the polity.”169 Again and again, 
national human rights institutions in transitioning states report a lack of the necessary 
funding and resources to perform their functions; frequently, they operate only in the 
capital city  and not far beyond170
168
 Reading the works of liberal pluralists such as Kymlicka, as well as advocates for indigenous 
communities such as James Anaya, it is striking that they struggle to characterize minority claims in 
such a way as to minimize the conflict they pose with liberal values.  They are quite reluctant to 
acknowledge areas of irreducible conflict that would force an either/or choice between minority and 
liberal values.  See Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, supra note __; Anaya, supra note __.
169
 Adeno Addis, On Human Diversity and the Limits of Toleration, in Ethnicity and Group Rights, 
supra, at __, 139.
170
 Malawi, Tanzania, and Nepal are examples.
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But the implications of these facts are more far- reaching than simply a 
practical obstacle to rights enforcement.  On the one hand, they mean that any set of 
rights supposedly guaranteed by the state may be utterly ephemeral, so that talking 
about a conflict, for example, between liberal rights and minority rights may be an 
entirely theoretical debate, the human rights equivalent of theological treatises on the 
number of angels that can dance on the head of a pin.  
But beyond this, the state may not be in the position of having the power to 
grant or deny rights or autonomy to its minority community at all. Rather, minority 
communities in some states are in the position of de facto governing themselves, and 
the state may not be have the capacity to challenge minority authority or to replace it 
with governance systems of its own.171 The issue of minority rights may arise only at 
the moment that the state gains enough power to challenge the status quo self -
governance by minority groups and attempts to eliminate or reduce minority 
autonomy.  This presents a very different context for considering minority claims and 
any challenges they pose to liberal rights or other state interests.
4. Criteria for Decision-making
While it may be possible to characterize conflicts between minority groups 
and the state in terms of liberal and minority rights, that does not necessarily mean 
that human rights analysis or norms will provide a basis for decision-making or 
distinguishing between claims. Because of all the gaps between liberal theory and the 
reality of severely divided new democracies discussed above, democratic theories of 
minority rights may not provide effective criteria for resolving those conflicts.  
Even where a minority does not itself perceive its claims as being based in 
recognized rights, the group may be tempted to do so by the existence of human rights 
171
 This is the case, for example, in some areas of Ethiopia.  
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as an effective way of recharacterizing minority claims to make them cognizable in 
court or before human rights institutions. For example, the Northern Ireland Human 
Rights Commission was asked to help define standards for the parades that are a 
tradition of both the Protestant and Catholic communities and that frequently present a 
flashpoint for conflict. While originally, neither community construed its concerns as 
a human rights claim, now the issues are being redefined in human rights terms.172
But according to Dominic Bryan’s case study, “what human rights approaches have 
been good at is holding the state accountable for the activities of the police and of its 
commissions and officials,” but “human rights instruments are not nearly so effective 
in providing guidance for inter-communal disputes.”  Rather than providing factors 
for balancing the parties’ respective interests and concerns, the introduction of human 
rights norms has merely encouraged government agencies to “couch… their decision 
in the language of rights” all the while “adopting a standardized boilerplate format for 
their determinations.”173   In this case at least, the addition of human rights standards 
has merely provided another gloss on the situation, rather than a principled basis for 
distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable parades.
As suggested above, democratic theories developed in well-established liberal 
democracies may emphasize factors that are tangential in severely divided or 
transitioning societies, factors such as the historicity of a group’s claim or the 
potential conflict it presents with liberal values that the state itself may not effectively 
enforce.  But if applying minority rights in the ways suggested by liberal and 
communitarian democratic theory misconstrues the crucial issues and interests at 
172 See Bryan, supra note __, at 241-42.
173 See id. at 249.
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stake, it may in turn merely complicate and obscure the conflict, rather than providing 
a principled basis for resolving it174
D. What Role Could National Human R ights Institutions Play?
In part B, I discussed the pragmatic reasons that national human rights 
institutions have not been as involved as they could be in minority concerns, and in 
part C I suggested that their disinterest in some part also reflects the fact that minority 
interests do not fall neatly into the liberal and minority rights categories predicted by 
democracy theory and defined by positive law.  But while democracy theory may 
have mistaken the nature of at least some minority claims in severely divided and 
transitioning states, national human rights institutions may nonetheless be able to 
effectively address and remedy those claims.  Not only this, they may be able to play 
a role long promoted by democracy and human rights advocates, but ill defined by 
them: that of a forum for productive dialogue between minority groups and the state.  
I will first consider the role national human rights institutions might play in regard to 
minority groups generally, and then their role in regard to indigenous groups with 
their own legal and political systems.  
1. Roles vis-à-vis Minority Groups Generally
By their nature, national human rights institutions are well designed to address 
at least some of the minority group concerns that do not fit the predicted mold.  For 
example, Bruce Berman suggests that one of the fundamental obstacles to the 
development of effective democratic governance and iner-ethnic stability in Africa is 
that government bureaucracy functions according to destructive clientelism defined 
174
 See also Sheridan Pauker, Spraying First and Asking Questions Later, 30 Ecology L. Q. 661, 667-68 
(2003) (Colombian indigenous group’s complaints regarding aerial herbicide spraying); Tenant & 
Turpel, supra note __, at 291 (Canadian indigenous group’s complaints regarding Canadian Air Force 
base). 
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along ethnic lines.175 Similarly, in the experience of ombudspersons who served 
indigenous communities, a large percentage of the complaints brought against 
community leadership concerned conflicts of interest and nepotism.176  The 
ombudsperson, with her mandate of rooting out government maladministration and 
favoritism of every kind, is ideally suited to address such concerns.  
 However, the capacity of individual national human rights institutions to 
address the disparate demands of minority communities discussed above depends to a 
large degree on their similarly disparate structure and legal mandates.177  Some 
unanticipated claims, like the above claims of corruption, will fall neatly into the 
ombudsperson’s or commissioner’s jurisdiction, while others, like the socio-economic 
claims discussed previously, will not. 
But the gaps between experience and theory discussed above also suggest 
another, more systemic role for national human rights institutions:  that of developing 
a better understanding of minority concerns and best practices principles for 
addressing them.  As has been illustrated by the results of my study, when national 
human rights institutions are accessible to minority groups and receptive to their 
claims, they obtain a wealth of direct information about the groups’ interests and 
concerns, including some that fall outside the typical understandings of minority 
group rights.  However, this information is nowhere collected or considered, and so it 
has not been taken into account in formulating policy or theory on such rights.  
175
 “[T]he state bureaucracy is a realm of nepotistic appropriation of office, ethnically biased 
distribution of patronage, extortion of bribes, and kick-backs and direct theft of public revenues…. 
democratic reforms in Africa cannot succeed, the bonds of ethnic communities cannot significantly 
relax and a civic politics of broader ties of cooperation cannot develop without a corresponding 
transformation of the bureaucratic apparatus.”  Bruce Berman, Ethnicity, Bureaucracy & Democracy: 
The Politics of Trust, in EDIA, supra note __, at 38, 39.
176
 See discussion, supra, section C.1.
177 See  Kaltenbach, supra note __, at 1.
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There is one institutional practice in particular that could serve as a resource 
for discovering and understanding minority concerns that are not currently addressed 
in minority rights law and theory: “good offices.”  “Good offices” refers to a national 
human rights institution’s use of its contacts, influence and mediation experience to 
conciliate a claim that does not actually fall within the institution’s formal 
jurisdiction.178 Good offices practices vary considerably between institutions: some 
institutions will offer to conciliate virtually any claim that comes in the door, whereas 
others stick closely to the terms of their mandate.179 In New Brunswick, for example, 
where the human rights commission’s mandate is narrowly limited to discrimination 
and to events on non-tribal lands, one-third of cases were good offices cases, 
including complaints of political favoritism and discrimination against tribal leaders, 
as well as derogatory comments by public officials and the media, and other incidents
falling outside the commission’s strictly defined jurisdiction.180  The commission in 
Ghana also encourages its local offices to accept good offices cases.181 Where 
institutions do offer good offices services, a systematic evaluation of those cases 
might yield valuable information about local concerns.
In the same vein, because the resolutions reached by national human rights 
institutions are neither binding nor precedent-creating, they present an opportunity for 
experimentation with a range of solutions for minority group problems and for
development of “best practices” guidelines.  Because minority interests are, as 
discussed above, so relational and contextual, some trial and error is in fact likely to 
be necessary in national, regional and local contexts to find good solutions.  As with 
178
 If informal conciliation does not resolve the claim, than the institution must either step aside or refer 
the claim to the agency that does have jurisdiction: informal efforts do not obligate the institution to 
take further formal steps to follow up on the claim, and indeed, by the terms of its mandate it could not 
do so.  See Williams, supra note __, at 51-57.
179 See ICHRP report, supra note __.
180 See id.
181 See ICHRP Report, supra note __, at 14-15.
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the good offices cases generally, if information were collected and made available in a 
systematic way, national human rights institutions could serve as a laboratory for 
ideas that might ultimate percolate up to the national level or be adopted by 
institutions in other regions.  
These possibilities offer a pragmatic approach to an ethereal concept long 
promoted by both democracy theorists and human rights advocates as a prescription 
for conflicts between minority groups and the state: dialogue. In this context, dialogue 
seems to mean all things to all people.  Democracy theorists envision a fundamental 
constitutional negotiation of the essential nature of the relationship between minority 
groups and the state, along the lines of James Tully’s’ proposal for a “post-imperial 
dialogue on the just constitution of culturally diverse societies”182 In the new 
minority rights treaties, dialogue is not the basis for establishing a just framework for 
the state but rather an iterative, ongoing process of consultation and participation in 
governance.183 Others propose dialogue for the purpose of nation-building in severely 
divided societies.  Adeno Addis suggests that “a genuine sense of shared identity, 
social integration, in multicultural and multiethnic societies will develop only through 
a process where minorities and majorities are linked in institutional dialogue.”184
Similarly, Leslye Obiora propose that “’dialogic democracy’ – recognition of the 
authenticity of the other, whose views and ideas one is prepared to listen to and 
debate, as a mutual process – is the only alternative to violence in many areas of the 
social order where disengagement is no longer a feasible option.’”185 But these 
182
 TULLY, supra note __, at 24; see also Multicultural Citizenship, supra note __, at 171 (liberal states’ 
fundamental “relations between national groups should be determined by dialogue” rather than by 
forcible imposition of liberal values).
183 See discussion supra section I.B.
184
 Addis, supra note __, at 130.
185
 Obiora, Supri, supra note __, at 660 (quoting Anthony Giddens, Living in  Post-traditional Society, 
in Reflexive Modernization 56, 106 (Ulrich Beck et al., eds. 1994)); see also Ibhawoh, supra note __, 
at 854.
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theorists do not suggest how these dialogues might take place, nor what particular 
characteristics would be necessary to provide an adequate forum for their envisioned 
dialogues.186
Certainly human rights institutions present a forum for dialogue of some sort 
between minority groups and the state over human rights values.  And if they were to 
establish a process of systemically collecting and considering the information they 
receive from minority claimants, this dialogue could become a multi-layered one, 
moving from the local level to the national and back again, and accreting mutual 
understanding over time.  But can the sort of dialogue carried on in national human 
rights institutions achieve such lofty goals as nation-building, social integration, and 
constitutional negotiation?  
In discussing the question of the ombudsperson’s role vis-à-vis minority 
groups at the International Ombudsman Institute conference in Quebec last year, the 
participating ombudspersons considered that the terms of their interactions with 
minority groups were already set by external influences: the legal frameworks for 
their offices, and the constraints of institutional competence and credibility.  A
national human rights institution’s mandate and its powers of investigation and 
reporting go more to enforcing known and understood legal rights than to defining 
those rights in the first place.187  Where the basis for minority rights is limited, where 
the balance between minority rights, individual rights and state values is a hotly 
debated political question, and especially where there is of yet no established legal 
186
 There are naysayers as well:  Iris Young contends that multicultural participants in a dialogue 
cannot reach mutual understanding, while Chandran Kukathas expresses the concern that they will 
understand each other, and that understanding will breed dislike and conflict.  See TULLY, supra note 
__, at 132-33 (quoting Young); Liberal Archipelago, supra note __, at 33. 
187
 “An Ombudsman may protect only what is guaranteed by the legal system, but no Ombudsman may 
protect something that does not exist. And the rights of minorities were, for quite some time, not 
included in the list of internationally recognised human rights. This situation has changed materially 
only during the recent decade but the emancipation of the rights of minorities cannot be considered as 
fully resolved even today.” Kaltenbach, supra note __, at 1.
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framework for weighing this balance, involvement in these issues takes the institution 
well outside its usual activities and stretches its credibility and legitimacy both with 
the government and with the public.188  In new democracies where rights are as yet ill 
defined, the national human rights institution may find itself playing this role, 
particularly through mechanisms like the good offices claims.189  However, it is not 
clear that these institutions will, except at times by happenstance, have the legal and 
political resources to do so effectively.  Furthermore, while the institution may have 
the authority to recommend change, it does not have the authority itself to enact that 
change either upon the law or the essential political structure of the state, and so it is 
not in a position to negotiate fundamental constitutional change of the sort envisioned
by many democracy theorists for cross-cultural dialogue. 
Due to these legal and institutional constraints, national human rights 
institutions are not well positioned to undertake the sort of “constitutional dialogue” 
advocated by some democracy theorists nor to address highly politicized and 
fundamental decisions about minority and majority interests. When minority interests 
strike at the core of a state’s identity and power relationships, a national human rights 
institution can never serve as more than a limited forum for dialogue. 
But a national human rights institution may be well suited for productive 
dialogue in less fraught situations, where it has the flexibility and accessibility to 
explore minority interests and to accrete knowledge of them gradually over time.  An 
institution that is receptive to minority claims is in a unique position, not only to 
address minority claims that lie beneath the surface of already identified minority 
interests and rights, but also to bring those claims up to the surface where they can be 
acknowledged and understood.
188 See IOI notes, supra note __.
189 See European Centre for Minority Issues, Minority Ombudsperson Project Network Conference 
Report (November 2003) at 19-20, available at ECMI website, www.ecmi.de.
Minority Rights, Minority Wrongs –Page 62
2. Indigenous Communities and Legal Pluralism
Furthermore, because of their particular strengths and flexibility of 
procedures, national human rights institutions could also serve a productive role in 
addressing the interests of indigenous groups.  For states within which indigenous
groups govern themselves autonomously and maintain their own legal systems, the 
power balance between indigenous groups and the state may be a crucial and 
precarious one, especially if such groups make up a substantial portion of the 
population.  These are therefore particularly acute examples of potential conflicts 
between minority and human rights.  And when they interact with these groups,
national human rights institutions face additional levels of complexity in dealing with 
what are in essence separate legal and political systems within the state. 
It is important to acknowledge at the outset that indigenous communities and 
cultures themselves are not singular but multiple, and differ amongst each other as to 
values and practices as much as any one of them does to state structures.   Bedouin 
blood feuds, for example, have little in common with Native American sentencing 
circles.  Likewise, the state structures and cultures in which such communities act 
range from liberal democracies to authoritarian governments to failed states, and from 
states with strong national identities to sharply divided states to states in which 
disparate cultures rarely interact.  Thus, it would be misleading to speak of conflicts 
between the state and indigenous cultures as if all such conflicts were of the same 
nature. 
Not only this, indigenous cultures are not static but dynamic, and not 
necessarily isolationist but often interactive.  Indeed, community laws and legal 
systems may not be ancient, customary, or based in tradition.  The image (and even to 
some extent the legal definition) of indigenous peoples and their practices includes all 
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of these elements, and indigenous communities themselves may call on tradition or 
ancient origin as legitimizing their laws and practices, even when those laws and 
practices are of recent vintage.  Both the state and the community may make use of 
this notion of tradition as a basis for legitimacy and recognition.  Therefore, it is 
important to recognize that the tension between indigenous laws and state laws is not 
necessarily one between old and new, between customary and written, or between 
traditional and modern, but may be far more complex, reflecting the dynamic 
interactions between groups and systems.190
In this sense, indigenous groups increasingly pose problem cases of the sort 
discussed in part C above.  The Métis in Canada, as well as the Tlapanec and other 
indigenous peoples in Mexico, have formed legal and political systems that are 
neither strictly indigenous nor defined by the state, but a deliberate blending of state 
and community ideals and practices.191
The legal and political structures in these systems of legal pluralism also vary 
considerably, particularly in the level of mutual recognition and interactivity between 
indigenous and state systems.  Indigenous communities may be organized into formal 
political structures or may operate more as social units than political ones. 
Community institutions may apply customary, religious, or other community-defined 
laws in place of or in addition to formal state law. Some states’ constitutions permit 
their courts to recognize indigenous communities’ legal decisions or apply some 
version of the community’s laws.   So, for example, the South African constitution 
affirms the legitimacy of tribal institutions and laws, the Ethiopian constitution 
permits the state to recognize religious courts, and the United States recognizes the 
190 See TULLY, supra note __; Ibhawoh, supra note __, at 841; Hébert & Aubry, supra note __ .
191 See Bell, supra note __; Hébert & Aubry, supra note __; Speed & Collier, supra note __
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authority of tribal courts on Native American reservations.192 But community legal 
institutions need not be recognized by the state to function as the community’s legal 
system.
Even though states do in some instances apply indigenous laws or recognize 
indigenous legal systems, precepts of constitutional supremacy might lead one to 
expect that constitutional norms, including human rights norms, would necessarily 
prevail over indigenous community law or practice.  Certainly, some constitutions do 
expressly provide that customary practices must comply with constitutional norms, 
and some courts do subject indigenous laws to constitutional mandates in the face of 
constitutional silence.193  But in other states, indigenous practices are themselves 
legitimized by the constitution, granting constitutional status to those practices and 
creating ambiguity about precedence.  For example, in Ethiopia, the constitution 
recognizes the rights of its “Nations, Nationalities and Peoples” along with numerous 
individual rights and does not indicate which should prevail in case of a conflict.194
Other states’ constitutions expressly exempt traditional practices from certain 
constitutional norms such as anti-discrimination rights.195 Within the United States, 
Supreme Court decisions have granted partial but not absolute sovereignty to tribal 
governments, and that sovereignty has at times been found to outweigh constitutional 
interests such as equal protection.196  And of course, some constitutions and courts do 
not address the issue at all.  
Furthermore, it is not just state policies toward indigenous legal systems that 
vary; the extent to which indigenous systems accept or reject the state’s system, and 
192 See SOUTH AF. CONST.; ETH. CONST; Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
193 See Ibhawoh, supra note __, at 848 (2000) (Ghana and Uganda).
194 See ETH. CONST. art. 39.  
195 See ZIMB. CONST., art 23(3); see also Ibhawoh, supra note __, at 843.
196 See Thomas Biolsi, Bringing the Law Back In: Legal Rights and the Regulation of Indian-White 
Relations on Rosebud Reservation, 36:4 CURRENT ANTHRO. 543, 545 (1995).
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even the extent to which they take account of it, also varies substantially.  Some 
communities maintain jurisdiction over family and minor civil and criminal matters 
while ceding larger cases to the state.197  Others claim jurisdiction over all issues, big 
or small.198  And indigenous communities may govern areas that the state considers 
private, or vice versa.199
In such contexts, minority group concerns will first be defined within the
minority community itself in the context of the community’s self-defined political and 
legal system.  Similarly, state concerns with community practices will confront not 
merely a claimed cultural exception to human rights norms, but a separate legal and 
political system operating under different norms and, at least potentially, conceiving 
of the conflict in alternative legal and political terms. The systems may differ not 
only in their substantive rules, but also in their processes, and even in the underlying 
assumptions, cultural values, and symbols that each system deploys.200
Even where a state recognizes the indigenous system, it is  typically the 
community that must adapt to the state system in order to be heard.   For example, 
indigenous claims to land must be proven according to state definitions of ownership 
(even if particularized to indigenous ownership), and in state institutions (land 
registration offices or courts) and by state processes, (formal presentation of evidence
of ownership as defined by the state).  Indigenous definitions, institutions, and 
processes will not stand, if opposed by others with state definitions, institutions and 
processes at their backs.201
197 See id. at 546.
198 See Hébert & Aubry, supra note __ (Tlapanec community in Mexico).
199 See Mark D. Rosen, Our Non-Uniform Constitution, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 1129, 1157 (1999) (discussing 
practice of “welfare checks” on U.S. Native American reservations).
200 See Joan Kimm, A Fatal Conjunction: Two Laws, Two Cultures 91-92 (2004).
201 See, e.g., Delgamuukw v. the Queen (1991), discussed in TULLY, supra note __, at 132 (The Gitskan 
and Wet’suwet’en nations’ claims for recognition of their territories were dismissed by a Canadian 
court because the evidence presented of ownership according to Aboriginal standards did not meet 
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But considering indigenous claims solely in state forums undercuts the group’s 
ability to characterize its claim as it understands it and also undercuts the 
philosophical justifications for the state to recognize such claims in the first place.  In 
addition, this will not satisfy those indigenous communities that claim from the state 
not only liberal ideals of tolerance and local autonomy, but also the communitarian 
ideals of participation as a constituent and of cultural survival not only as an isolated 
unit within the state but as an interactive, incorporated part of the state.
Requiring the indigenous community to frame its interests in the state’s terms 
and pursue them through state processes and institutions also raises again the question 
of what is required for meaningful dialogue between the state and its communities.  
While many liberal theorists appear to endorse the notion that productive dialogue can 
be had on the state’s terms, against the background of liberal institutions and values,
some indigenous groups contend that their concerns are fundamentally misstated and 
misunderstood in this context. 202  Picking up this concern, communitarian 
commentators contend that “the dialogue must be one in which the participants are 
recognised and speak in their own languages and customary ways.”203  Meanwhile, 
other theorists argue that there can be no intercultural understanding for exactly these 
reasons.204  Certainly the parties must agree upon some common forum to carry on a 
dialogue at all, 205 and currently such dialogue is being carried out only in state-
Canadian requirements for proving title.)
202
 “The adjudicative mechanism proposed by the state, namely the domestic legal system, is 
inadequate.  Within domestic legal systems, indigenous claims are divided and translated into 
categories that decontextualise and depoliticize them.  Claims for political recognition become 
questions of minority rights, language rights, equality rights and education rights. Collective claims by 
indigenous peoples are read down to become individual claims by indigenous persons.  In every case, 
concepts like justiciability and the separation of law and politics are used to purge these claims of any 
political content which is offensive to the state, or which challenges the notion that the state represents 
the population.”  C.C. Tenant and M.E. Turpel, A Case Study of Indigenous Peoples: Genocide, 
Ethnocide and Self-Determination, 59 Nordic J. Int’l L 287, 291 (1990) (Innu people in Canada).
203 See TULLY, supra note __, at 24.
204 See discussion, supra, at text accompanying note __.
205
 Adeno Addis raises a similar concern regarding choice of language:  “How does the notion of 
Minority Rights, Minority Wrongs –Page 67
defined fora such as the courts and the national human rights institutions.206 Is there 
an alternative? 
One possibility would be for the state to adapt to the community’s system in 
certain contexts, either by participating in the community’s cultural, legal, and 
political processes or by developing hybrid processes, rather than requiring the 
community to adapt to its own.  This would permit the indigenous group to participate 
in defining the forum and the terms of  discussion.  Some groups such as the Métis 
have already demonstrated a willingness to accept some state involvement in their 
internal governance in return for the benefits of state recognition and tolerance.
As discussed above, national human rights institutions’ capacity to serve as a 
forum for dialogue in the context of minority rights is limited in certain respects.  But 
nonetheless, these institutions might be able to participate in community processes 
more readily than other state institutions could do.  Because their procedures are more 
informal and flexible than those of courts, most have some freedom to innovate. An 
ombudsperson could conceivably appear before community courts or councils, or 
could adopt a community’s arbitration practices when considering community 
complaints. At the same time, because national human rights institutions lack 
enforcement powers, their participation would not bind the state or pose a threat to its 
sovereignty.
Another relevant feature of human rights institutions is their focus on 
discussion and conciliation as a first approach to conflict. Although the extent to 
which indigenous groups rely on consensual systems for conflict resolution is often 
overstated, in at least some instances there may be commonalities between 
pluralistic solidarity, which emphasizes dialogue among groups and societies as networks of 
communication, deal with the question of linguistic plurality?  … [H]ow would dialogue (and shared 
deliberation) be possible without the dominant group coercively imposing a single language (more 
likely its language) on all citizens?” Addis, supra note __, at 138.  
206 See TULLY, supra note __; JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1996).
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institutions. Ombudspersons in places as disparate as Burkina Faso and Canada 
reported feeling a sense of compatibility between their techniques and local 
preferences for conciliatory approaches to conflict resolution.207 The indigenous 
assessment was more skeptical about the extent of the resemblance:  “In order for the 
commission to serve Native people they have to understand Native people.  They have 
to learn about Native cultures, traditions, and spirituality.”208
So far, only a few institutions have tried to apply this prescription.  Even 
among institutions with programs or officers devoted to an indigenous group or 
groups, almost none have tried to participate in or incorporate indigenous practices in 
any way.   The examples I found were scattered:  an ombudsperson for American 
Indian Families in Minnesota engages in traditional prayer and rituals with her clients 
before beginning meetings; 209 a local Argentinean ombudsperson’s office that works 
extensively with the indigenous Mapuche people held a workshop to train its 
employees in traditional Mapuche mediation techniques;210 and the African 
Ombudsman Association discussed the topic of reclaiming traditional mediation 
practices at its 2003 annual meeting.  In one case, it was not a human rights 
institution, but local police who adopted indigenous practices in an effort to bridge a 
divide between liberal rights, security concerns, and minority rights in addressing 
accusations of witchcraft and witch killings and trials.211
207
  Ms. Von der Esch suggested that the use of prominent local leaders to head local offices and 
vigorous public education campaigns had also been crucial to success in Burkina Faso.  See von der 
Esch correspondence, supra note __.
208
 Williams, supra note __, at 107-09.
209
 Telephone conversation with Dawn Blanchard, Ombudsman for American Indian Families (Sep. 22, 
2003) (notes on file with author).
210
 E-mail correspondence with Blanca Tirachini, Defensora del Pueblo de la ciudad de Neuquen, 
Argentina (May 16 & 19, 2003); with María Laura Cassiet, Defensor del Pueblo de la Nacion, 
Argentina (June 26-27, 2003); and with Marianne von der Esch, Head of International Division, The 
Parliamentary Ombudsmen, Sweden (May 21, 23 & 31, 2003) (hereafter “von der Esch 
correspondence”) (notes on file with author).
211
 John and Jean Comaroff describe what they call “a small vanguard of diviner detectives” in a local 
police force: 
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However, pursuing this approach would prove problematic on levels from the 
most superficial to the most fundamental.  First, this is not an easy task at a pragmatic 
level..  If most human rights institutions have not mustered the will and resources to 
engage in simple outreach programs to minority groups, such as hiring staff who 
speak local languages, it is unlikely that they will organize themselves enough to 
master local legal systems. And even if undertaken in good faith, walking the 
tightrope of participating in community processes without becoming a part of them is 
likely to strain institutional capacity and credibility in all the ways discussed above. 
Numerous authors have noted the difficulty of understanding the fundamental 
concepts of another legal system.212  Even if operating with the best of intentions, an 
outsider’s perception of the significant aspects of another’s system is likely to depend 
on her own interests in the system. Human rights advocates, alternative dispute 
resolution advocates, and others tend to selectively acknowledge and legitimize 
elements of indigenous legal processes that favor their projects, such as mediation 
practices, and ignore elements that would undermine their projects, such as corporal 
or capital punishment.  They also tend to acknowledge and legitimize community 
values that align with their projects, such as respect for the environment, but to 
“Described in the national media as ‘one of the few success stories in a police force that has almost 
collapsed under the strain of democracy,’ Gopane uses methods that require a high level of local 
knowledge.  At relevant moments, he exchanges his police uniform for the paraphernalia of a 
traditional healer.  In him, the forensic and the oracular, scientific investigation and social diagnostics, 
become one. … While such efforts remain unorthodox and limited, they do seem to be spreading; the 
SAPS liaison officer in the Northwest Province, Patrick Asneng, told us that dealing with the occult has 
become part of the mundane work of policing in the countryside.” John Comaroff & Jean Comaroff, 
Policing Culture, Cultural Policing, 29 Law & Soc. Inquiry 513, 530-31 (2004)
212 See, e.g., Vivian Grosswald Curran, Cultural immersion, Diference and Categories in U.S. 
Comparative Law, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 43 (1998).  Concerning Malay customary law, Joseph Minattur 
asserts that “The only persons who can be expected to have a clear understanding and a proper 
appraisal of customary law are the traditional leaders of the community.  They are interested in 
maintaining the norms of their community and to them should be instructed the administration of the 
customary law.  They will know how to reinterpret it to keep pace with social changes, changes which 
their own community has accepted as being relevant to it.” See Joseph Minattur, The Nature of Malay 
Customary Law, in FOLK LAW, VOL. I, supra note __, at 558.  
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declare the hegemony of human rights values when there is a conflict, as in the case 
of child marriage.
Beyond this, historically most efforts by states to incorporate indigenous legal 
systems have represented a mechanism for state hegemony over the community,
rather than an attempt at true dialogue or genuine acceptance of community norms as 
constitutive of the state. The most well known examples are those of efforts by 
colonial states to codify their understanding of the customary law used by the peoples 
they colonized.  This was problematic on several levels: first, the colonialists rarely 
got it right, second, they transplanted the customary law into the colonial system and 
process and thereby changed it, and third, they used this process as a means to 
implement a two-tier system of justice in which those they colonized invariably 
occupied the lower tier.213  In worst case scenarios, the “customary law” system was 
not just as an incident of repression among others, but as an active part of the 
development of a whole repressive system, as in South Africa where 
“institutionalization of customary law was thus part of a process for redistributing 
power” during the colonial period in South Africa, “deceiv[ing] people into believing 
that law supported their interests.”214 Colonial governments’ misapprehension of,
mischaracterization of, and misuse of indigenous religious and community legal 
norms has been well documented across numerous settings and cultures.215
Such problems have not been limited to colonial settings.  Rather, efforts to 
import progressive values into local processes served to undermine both systems 
under the communist Derg government in Ethiopia.  The Derg tried to make use of a 
local village council model to implement their own progressive rules on marriage, but 
213 See Martin Chanock, Law, Custom and Social Order (1985).
214See Robert J. Gordon, The White Man’s Burden, in FOLK LAW, VOL. I, supra note __, at 367, 369-70. 
215 See e.g.,  M.B. Hooker, Legal Pluralism: An Introduction to Colonial and Neo-Colonial Laws 
(1975); Chanock, supra note __.
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the councils failed after a couple of years.  From the state’s perspective, the councils 
were problematic because they tended to function according to find ways to 
accommodate the formal rules to local preferences.  From the community’s 
perspective, the council’s use of the formal rules undermined their authority, which 
stemmed from knowledge of and adherence to community practices.216
By attempting to adapt or participate in indigenous legal systems, a national 
human rights institution risks creating “an illusion of popular justice” that “is not 
accountable via the usual democratic representative processes,”217 It also risks serving 
as a mechanism for state oppression of indigenous groups, stirring up conflict by 
increased interaction, and undermining its own credibility, both with the indigenous 
group and with the majority.  But there are ways of mitigating this risks.  Of course, 
such efforts should be pursued only upon an expression of interest by the indigenous 
community.  An indigenous community member or members might act as the 
community’s representative within the institution.  Depending upon community 
preferences for its level of involvement, an institution might keep itself apart from 
internal community systems but incorporate some aspects of the community systems 
into its practices, or alternatively, might appear as a representative of the state within 
the community system but make no effort to adapt community practices in its own 
work. 
As it is, indigenous communities have no choice but to pursue their claims in 
state institutions, through state processes, according to the state’s terms.  Carefully 
constructed, an ombudsperson or national human rights commission might offer a 
forum for or participant in dialogue that allows at least some possibility of translation.  
Conclusion
216
 Pankhurst, supra note __, in LEGAL TRANSPLANTS (Elisabetta Grande, ed.).
217 See Gordon, supra note__, at 386.
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A final anecdote concerning the Tlapanec community in Mexico, mentioned 
above, illustrates the complexities both of the relationships between minority groups 
and the state and of their deployment of human rights norms as a means of exercising 
power within those relationships.  The Tlapanec community is an indigenous group in 
Mexico that has become dissatisfied with its experiences in the Mexican judicial 
system.  Members of the community found the legal standards, processes, values, and 
language, alien and confusing.  They also found the police attention to their area 
inadequate to maintain order.  In response, they initiated a parallel judicial system, 
which operates according to community norms and in the Tlapanec language.  The 
Mexican government views this as a challenge to its sovereignty.218
Human rights claims are present on all sides of this conflict.  The Tlapanec 
people claim violations of their due process rights by the state, because state trials are 
conducted in Spanish and they are not provided with translators.  They also claim 
violations of their community justice norms: if an accused is imprisoned during vital 
agricultural seasons, not only the defendant but his family will suffer as a result.  
Finally, they claim these community rights to autonomy and self-determination 
authorize their development of their own system.  The Mexican government claims 
that the Tlapanec legal process violates due process norms and exceeds the scope of 
the community’s authority.219
The Tlapanec creation of a new legal system is a direct challenge to the 
legitimacy of the Mexican government and its human rights agenda.  It was developed 
by the community to meet its own needs, but is not a direct continuation of ancient 
practices.  It is couched in part in terms of individual liberal rights, in part in terms of 
minority rights, and in part in terms of alternative community norms.  It shifts the 
218 See Hébert & Aubry, supra note __ at 11.  
219 See id.
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balance of power in the community’s relationship with the national government by 
claiming functions the state views as its own.
But although Mexico’s National Commission for Human Rights boasts an 
outreach program for indigenous groups, and although its constitution was amended 
in the 1990s to introduce indigenous rights, the Deputy Commissioner for Human 
Rights, a devoted advocate whom I met in Quebec, shook her head blankly when 
asked about the Tlapanec.  She had never heard of them, and the Commission has to 
her knowledge played no role whatsoever in this classic conflict over minority 
rights.220
By their structure, mandates, and skills, national human rights institutions 
could play a role in mitigating these disputes in democracies new and old, but often, 
they do not.  Lack of legal incentives, political will and resources all limit their 
involvement, as do misunderstandings of what is at stake, driven by distant 
democratic theory.  There are some minority interests, especially those in highly 
conflict-ridden states or concerning highly politicized issues that a national human 
rights institution could never effectively take on.  But there are others that these 
institutions are well suited to address.
Liberal and communitarian theorists have looked for centering principles to 
provide a fixed point to which disparate minority claims might relate and to serve as 
the philosophical core justifying consideration of their concerns.  Minority demands, 
such as the Tlapanec’s, for tolerationof their cultural practices could be characterized, 
for example, as a group demand for liberty, for group freedom from state interference. 
This characterization is an appealing one on certain levels, for it frames the group’s 
220 See IOI notes, supra note __; Jorge Madrazo, New Policies on Human Rights in Mexico: The 
National Commission for Human Rights 1988-1993, in THE INTERNATIONAL OMBUDSMAN 
ANTHOLOGY, supra note __, at 337, 338 & 352.  The Commission also has studied social economic and 
political conditions through its “Program for Natives.”  Magdalena Aguilar Alvarez, The Teaching, 
Learning and Training Process for Human Rights, in id..
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demand in terms that resonate with liberal philosophy and can therefore be analyzed 
in traditional liberal terms.  Demands for liberty are common currency in our courts 
and legislatures, and so these institutions feel themselves equipped to balance such 
claims with other concerns.  In such a construction of the demand, in any given case, 
a group demand for liberty might stand in tension with an individual demand for 
liberty within the group or with the state’s interest in promoting goals of equality or 
security.  In this vein, Kymlicka and other liberal pluralists seek to define minority 
interests in terms of their relation to individual autonomy.  
But while it may be appealing for these reasons to characterize minority and 
indigenous interests as being claims for liberty, they do not seem to fit the mold. 
Isaiah Berlin long ago argued that the desire for internal community autonomy “has 
little to do with the classical Western notion of liberty as limited only by the danger of 
doing harm to others.”221  He characterized this instead as a desire for “recognition –
of their class or nation, or colour or race – as an independent source of human 
activity, as an entity with a will of its own, intending to act in accordance with it 
(whether it is good, or legitimate or not), and not to be ruled, educated, guided.”222
Rather than representing an increase in liberty amongst the group, this recognition of 
community existence and independence may well reduce the liberty of its members, 
who will to some extent be governed by this community identity – but who may 
prefer that identity and governance to non-recognition and liberty.223  And since 
Berlin, other efforts have been made to refine this notion of “recognition” or 
“belonging” and the tensions it presents with guaranteed liberty rights.224
221
 Isaiah Berlin, The Search for Status, reprinted in The Power of Ideas 195, 198 (ed. Henry Hardy 
2000).
222 Id. at 195.
223 See id. at 197.  
224 See Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom (2003).
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Communitarians such as Tully have accordingly characterized minority claims as 
being alternative forms of self-rule.  
In so doing, however, liberal and communitarian theorists have clung to the 
notion that minority concerns could be characterized in terms of some single unifying 
principle, even as they recognized the relational and disparate nature of those claims.  
Chandran Kukathas has cautioned against casting all minority group claims in the 
same mold, and the experiences and analysis of national human rights institutions 
suggest that this warning is correct.225
Indeed, one reason for the apparently diverse nature of minority rights and 
claims seems to be that they are to some degree not merely related to, but actually a 
projection of, the interests of the state. What the state and the majority understand to 
be “minority rights” is not the set of all interests that a minority groups claims, but 
rather, only the subset of those interests that do not happen, in their state, to coincide 
with those of the majority. This is true of the liberal approach as well as the others:  
minority interests in liberal values are not minority interests, merely ordinary ones.  
So to Kymlicka and Tully, living in a liberal democratic state that guarantees 
individual rights as a matter not only of course but of national identity, minority 
claims appear to be claims for the autonomy to pursue community-defined, at times 
illiberal values.  But for other states with other concerns, minority claims resound 
differently, according to their own terms of power.
 In this vein, Adeno Addis’s comment on an additional aspect of minority 
interests is telling:
 “The complaints many cultural and ethnic minorities have against majorities is not 
that they are forbidden to affirm privately their convictions and commitments and the  
capacity to plead as special interests in the political and economic markets, but rather 
that they ought not be seen as special, narrow and private interests while the culture 
225 See Kukathas, supra note __, at 33-34. 
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and the ethnic affiliation of the majority is viewed implicitly or explicitly as 
representing the general interest.”226
Because minority rights are in the end not absolute but relational, relative to 
the nature of the state, democratic theory and concepts of rights based in the 
experiences of well-established liberal democratic states cannot be expected to 
capture the concerns of minority groups in new and severely divided democracies.   
Although new democracies are adopting either liberal or communitarian forms of 
government that superficially bear the forms advocated by liberal and communitarian 
democratic theory, and although they may use the rhetoric of liberal and minority 
rights to describe and justify their choices, their purposes in doing so and the effects 
on minority group concerns are not likely to follow the predicted path.  In these 
complex contexts, national human rights institutions could serve as a necessary forum 
for consideration of disparate and disputed minority rights.
226
 Addis, supra note __, at 125.
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Appendix: Methodology
This article is based on three lines of research:  a qualitative study of the 
publicly available information about national human rights institutions worldwide; a 
review of case studies of individual national human rights institutions and indigenous 
communities; and interviews and participation in public discussion with individual 
ombudspersons.  
As discussed in the introduction, the purpose of the tripartite approach was to 
balance the strengths and weaknesses of each research method and to use the data
gathered in one line of research to catalyze the others. On its own, the data generated 
by a broad empirical study is inevitably unmoored from the social and political 
context that provides its meaning, but its results can nonetheless suggest trends and 
provide a context for understanding the significance of individual cases.  Likewise, 
the otherwise anecdotal insights of individual cases can be measured against and 
grounded in the general findings of the empirical study.  These cases also suggest 
crucial factors for determining which aspects of the empirical study deserve attention 
and provide a spot check for the trends suggested by that study.  Finally, my 
conversations with ombudspersons and commissioners provided insight into and 
context for both modes of research and were also an excellent source of individual 
case information.  I am grateful to all who generously shared their knowledge with 
me.  
In the following sections, I describe the selection criteria and sources used for 
each of the three lines of research.
I. Database/Qualitiative Study
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The first line of research, a survey of publicly available information about 
national human rights institutions worldwide, is to my knowledge the first such study 
of its kind. 
A. Selection criteria
1.  All identified national human rights institutions; 
2. Those local and regional institutions that report work with minority 
groups; 
3. Those specialized institutions that have work with minority, ethnic or 
indigenous groups or on issues of discrimination and racism as their 
mandate.
The database includes information on all identified national human rights 
institutions, including ombudspersons, human rights commissions and hybrids of 
these institutions, whether they have done work with minority groups or not.  It
includes data only on those local and regional institutions for which I found some 
indication that they were in fact working with minority groups, and only on those 
specialized institutions that work with minority or ethnic groups or on issues of 
racism or discrimination.  
I sought to identify national human rights institutions and the relevant 
specialized institutions by searching the records of international and regional 
organizations that work with such institutions, as well as through the International 
Ombudsman Institute, through scholarly studies of their work, and through individual 
contacts and searches of the internet.  Because local and regional institutions are so 
numerous, I did not actively search them out, but rather, collected data on their work 
with minority groups as I came across it in other settings.
B. Sources
1. Primary sources
a. National human rights institutions websites
b. National human rights institutions reports
c. National human rights institutions brochures and informational 
materials
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d. Direct correspondence with national human rights institution 
officials
2. Secondary sources
a. International and regional non-governmental organization 
website
b. International and regional non-governmental organization 
reports
c. Scholarly books and articles
d. News reporting
The database contains three basic types of information about the institutions, 
to the extent that I was able to find such information: contact information, its general 
functions and authority, and its work, if any, with minority groups.  The first two 
types of information are included solely for background purposes and are not reported 
in full or for all institutions.   Data on actual activities was not available for all 
identified institutions.  Not all human rights institutions make public reports of their 
activities, and even amongst those that do, it can be difficult to find and obtain.  
Language barriers, for example, presented an obstacle, and there are disparities in the 
informatino reported.  There may also of course be differences between actual 
activities and reported activities.
The database includes information on national human rights institutions’ own 
public reporting of their work with minority groups, both on their websites and in 
their public reports and informational materials. The database also contains 
information from secondary sources: from the international and regional bodies that 
work with national human rights institutions, and from books, articles and reports 
discussing certain institutions and countries. 
II. Case studies of national human rights institutions and minority groups
A. Selection criteria
1. Reliability.  I gave preference to case studies with characteristics 
indicating reliability, such as the author’s involvement in primary 
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research, availability of other reliable and relevant materials to confirm 
some aspects of the data or conclusions, contact with the author, and 
peer review..
2. Factual detail concerning the subject of the study and its political and 
social context.
3. Cross-disciplinary complementarity. I gave preference to case studies 
that offered insights from other relevant non-law fields, such as 
anthropology.
4. Consonance with the issues and themes raised by the other lines of 
research.
B. Sources
1. Published articles and books
2. Unpublished papers and doctoral dissertations
All cited case studies were undertaken by scholars or non-governmental 
organizations and focused either upon a particular national human rights institution, or 
upon a particular minority group, or both.  I looked in particular for studies on human 
rights institutions known to work with minority groups or known to work in multi-
ethnic areas.
III.  Interviews and discussions with individual ombudspersons and 
commissioners
A. Selection criteria
1. Work with minority groups
2. Responsiveness
3. Available contacts and introductions
B. Sources
Many of the interviews and discussions cited in this article took place in 
person at the International Ombudsman Institute meeting in Quebec City, Quebec in 
September 2004.  Other interchanges with ombudspersons and commissioners took 
place by phone and e-mail. I contacted ombudspersons and commissioners based on 
information indicating that they had worked actively with minority groups.
